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F o r ew o r d

The AICPA Tax Division represents the views of the 230,000 members of
the AICPA on tax matters. Many AICPA members work regularly with the
tax law, applying it to business and individual taxpayers at all levels of in
come. We have a unique perspective of the tax law and believe that we are
obligated, in the public interest, to analyze and express our views on major
tax proposals. We have analyzed The President’s Tax Proposals to the Con
gress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity, and our comments are presented
herein.
The AICPA comments were developed by the various subcommittees of
the AICPA tax division and approved by the tax division executive commit
tee. Listed below are the Executive Committee members and subcommit
tee chairmen who approved these comments. The work of the many other
tax division members who made substantial contributions to this project is
greatly appreciated.
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SUMMARY OF GENERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS

These comments reflect the general views of the AICPA Tax Division on
the Administration’s May 1985 tax reform plan, as well as the Division’s
reaction to selected specific proposals in the plan. Our general views, de
veloped more thoroughly in the following pages, may be summarized as
follows:
1. We support the concept of lowering rates and base broadening consis
tent with sound economic and fiscal policy. We feel this should only
be done after a careful and thorough analysis of the related economic
and tax policy issues.
2. A moratorium on further tax legislation is needed until such time as
the macroeconomic effects of the Administration’s proposals are bet
ter understood. During the period of such a moratorium, an ap
pointed nonpartisan commission should seek to arrive at a prudent,
overall plan for tax reform and a series of proposals for tax changes
that will lead to fairness, simplicity, and economic growth.
3. We question whether the goal of an economically, politically, and so
cially neutral tax system is realistic. Historically, many tax changes
have been undertaken to encourage or discourage certain economic,
political, and social behavior. Presumably, this will occur again in the
future and “tax neutrality” will then need to be set aside.
4. The proposals often selectively ignore policies that have historically
1

formed the basis for tax accounting concepts. In addition, the tax
accounting concepts found in this plan are inconsistently applied and
lack sound reasoning. This results in the absence of a clear definition
of what the tax accounting concepts should be and how they can be
applied consistently.
5. The proposals do not adequately address the impact on the interre
lationships between federal, state, and local governments. The overall
effect on such relationships is likely to be adverse, and more consid
eration of the implications is needed.
6. If it is determined that major tax reform is needed at this time, we
urge the careful selection of only those changes that will actually
achieve the desired goals. Transition rules that will lend a substantial
degree of stability to the tax law should also be included.
7. Many of the proposals within the Administration’s plan offer signifi
cant improvements and strive toward simplification, while others in
troduce still further complexity and create more problems. For this
reason, the AICPA neither supports nor opposes the entire plan.
Rather, we have examined each item individually and either sup
ported it, opposed it, or recommended modification to it. Our specific
comments elaborate on these conclusions.

SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC COMMENTS
Support
Proposal

Oppose
Proposal

Recommend
Modification

INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES
CHAPTER 1.

1.01

Reduce Marginal Tax
Rates ........................................

CHAPTER 2.

2.01
2.02

2

REDUCE
M ARGINAL TAX
RATES
X

INCREASE
FAIRNESS FOR
FAMILIES

Increase ZBA and
Personal E xem ptions..............
Combine Tax Benefits
for Elderly, Blind, and
Disabled into Expanded
Credit ......................................

X

X

2.03
2.05

Repeal Two-Earner
D e d u c tio n ....................
Replace Child and
Dependent Care Credit
with Deduction ..........

CHAPTER 3.

Part A.

3.02

Part B.

3.06

Part C.
3.07
3.08
Part D.
3.09
Part E.
3.11

Part F.
3.13

Support
Proposal

Oppose
Proposal

Recommend
Modification

X

X

MAKE THE
SYSTEM MORE
NEUTRAL AND
FAIR

Excluded Sources of
Income— Fringe
Benefits
Repeal $5,000 Exclusion
for Employer-provided
Death B e n e fits..............

X

Excluded Sources of
Income— Wage
Replacement Payments
Repeal Exclusion for
Unemployment and
Disability Payments . . . .

X

Excluded Sources of
Income— Other
Limit Scholarship and
Fellowship Exclusion . . .
Repeal Exclusion for
Prizes and A w a rd s........

X
X

Preferred Uses of
Income
Repeal Deduction of
State and Local Taxes ..

X

Tax Abuses— Mixed
Business/Personal Use
Limit Deduction for
Entertainm ent and
Business Meal Expenses

X

Tax Abuses— Income
Shifting
Adjust Tax Rate on
Unearned Income of
Minor Children ............

X

3

Support
Proposal
3.14

3.15

Revise G rantor and
Non-Grantor Trust
T axation....................................
Revise Income Taxation
of Estates ................................

CHAPTER 4.

4.01

4.04
4.05
4.06

5.01

Recommend
Modification

X
X

REDUCE
RECORD
KEEPING AND
COMPLEXITY

Impose Floor on
Employee Business
Expense and Other
Miscellaneous
Deductions ..............................
Repeal Adoption
Expense D e d u c tio n ................
Repeal Income
Averaging ................................
Simplify Penalty
Provisions ................................

CHAPTER 5.

Oppose
Proposal

X
X
X
X

SIMPLIFY THE
SYSTEM OF
FILING

Implement Return-Free
S y ste m ......................................

X

BUSINESS AND CAPITAL
INCOME TAXES
CHAPTER 6.

6.02

4

REVISE THE
TAXATION OF
CORPORATE
INCOME

Reduce Double Taxation
of Corporate Earnings
Distributed to
Shareholders............................

X

Support
Proposal
6.03

Repeal $100/$200
Dividend Income
E xclusion..................................

CHAPTER 7.

7.01

7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05

7.07

8.01

8.02

8.03
8.04

8.05

Recommend
Modification

X

REVISE
TAXATION OF
BUSINESS
PROPERTY AND
CAPITAL ASSETS

Adopt New Capital Cost
Recovery System
(CCRS) ....................................
Repeal Investment Tax
Credit ......................................
Revise Tax Treatment of
Capital Gains ..........................
Index In ventories....................
Retain $5,000 Limit on
Expensing Depreciable
Business Property ..................
Deny Rate Reduction
Benefit Attributable to
Excess Depreciation ..............

CHAPTER 8.

Oppose
Proposal

X
X
X
X

X

X

MEASURE
INCOME
PROPERLY

Revise Accounting
Rules for Production
Costs ........................................
Recognize Gain on
Pledges of Installment
Obligations ..............................
Limit Use of Cash
Method of Accounting ..........
Repeal Reserve Method
for Bad Debt
Deductions ..............................
Repeal Mining and Solid
Waste Reclamation and
Closing Cost Deduction ........

X

X
X

X

X
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Support
Proposal
CHAPTER 9.

9.02
9.03
9.04

Part A.

Recommend
Modification

REVISE
TAXATION OF
ENERGY AND
NATURAL
RESOURCES

Repeal Percentage
Depletion ................................
Revise Minimum Tax on
Intangible Drilling Costs . . . .
Revise Royalty T ax atio n ........

CHAPTER 10.

Oppose
Proposal

X
X
X

REFORM
TAXATION OF
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS

Commercial Banks and
Thrift Institutions

Repeal Special Rules for
Depository Institution
Bad Debt D e d u c tio n s............
10.02 Deny Deduction for
Interest to Carry TaxExempt Bonds ........................
10.03 Repeal Tax Exemption
for Large Credit U n io n s ........
10.04 Repeal Reorganization
Rules for Financially
Troubled Thrift
O rganizations..........................
10.05 Repeal Special Rules for
Net Operating Losses of
Depository In stitu tio n s..........

10.01

CHAPTER 12.

12.01

6

X
X

X

X

MODIFY OTHER
SPECIFIC
SUBSIDIES

Repeal Tax Credit for
Qualified R ehabilitation........

CHAPTER 13.
13.02

X

X

CURTAIL TAX
SHELTERS

Extend At-Risk
Limitation to Real
E s ta te ........................................

X

Support
Proposal
13.03

13.04

Revise Alternative
Minimum Tax for Non
corporate Taxpayers ..............
Revise Corporate
Minimum T a x ..........................

CHAPTER 14.

14.01

14.02

14.03

14.04

14.05

14.06

14.07

15.01
15.02

Recommend
Modification

X
X

REVISE
TREATMENT OF
RETIREMENT
SAVINGS

Increase Spousal
Individual Retirement
Account Limit ........................
Unify Rules for
Distributions from TaxFavored Retirement
Plans ........................................
Modify Deduction Rules
for Tax-Favored
Retirement P la n s ....................
Modify Annual Limits
on Contributions and
Benefits under TaxFavored Plans ..........................
Apply Ten Percent
Recapture Tax to
Qualified Plan Assets
Reverting to E m p lo y e r..........
Revise Cash or Deferred
Arrangement (Section
401(k)) and Employer
Matching Contribution
Rules ........................................
Modify Rules for
Benefit F o rfeitures..................

CHAPTER 15.

Oppose
Proposal

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

REFORM INTER
NATIONAL
TAXATION

Reform Foreign Tax
Credit ............................
Modify Sourcing Rules
for Income and
Deductions ....................

X

X
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Support
Proposal
15.03

15.04

15.05

Replace Second
Dividend and Interest
Taxes with Branch-Level
Tax ............................................
Revise Taxation of
Foreign Exchange Gains
and Losses ..............................
Reform the Mirror
System of Taxation for
the United States
Possessions ..............................

Oppose
Proposal

Recommend
Modification

X

X

X

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CONCLUSIONS
MORATORIUM
We urge those involved in the policy-making process to consider the likely
effect of such a major systemic change on the national economy. It is our
view that these effects have not been properly studied and quantified and
that such a study should be an integral part of the 1985 tax reform effort.
Perhaps one of the more troublesome assertions in the original Treasury
Department plan of November 1984 was the following:
Although it is possible to identify the industries that would lose special tax
preferences, it is impossible to predict the precise economic effects of the
entire package of Treasury Departm ent proposals on all industries and indi
viduals in the economy. Although many mathematical models of the econ
omy exist, economic science simply is not sufficiently precise to allow accu
rate prediction of the effects of reforms as fundamental and pervasive as
those proposed by the Treasury Departm ent; accordingly, this Report con
tains no such attempt at precise quantification of economic effects, (vol. I,
p. 43)

At the time the Administration released its plan in May of this year, there
was discussion that macroeconomic studies should be undertaken, with the
results of the studies being publicly released.
To date, we do not have the Treasury’s views on the macroeconomic ef
fects of this plan. This should be unacceptable to Congress and the Ameri
can public.
8

The AICPA has previously testified in support of a moratorium on tax
legislation and continues to support that position. Within the past decade,
the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the 1978 Revenue Act, the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the
1984 Deficit Reduction Act, and several technical corrections acts (with
that for the 1984 law still to come) have all entered the tax code in the name
of reform, fairness, or economic growth. How successful they may have
been in those contexts might well be the subject of discussion; but what is
clear is that they have also left us with rapidly escalating complexity, in
stability in our tax structure, and a growing despair by taxpayers. The abil
ity of taxpayers to comply with the law, as well as make business decisions
affected by the law, is impaired by frequent, sweeping tax reforms.
We therefore urge—at the very least—that any major tax legislation not
be enacted until such time as its macroeconomic effects are analyzed, pub
licized, and debated. All of us—as policymakers, practitioners, taxpayers,
and citizens—have too much at stake in the economic impact of the deci
sions being considered to be granted less.
We support reform to achieve greater fairness and simplicity. We also
favor stabilizing the system. Relatively few changes to substantive law per
mit individual and business taxpayers to understand and live with the rules.
In turn, better compliance and better tax administration is bound to flow
from such stability.
Therefore, in addition to delaying structural change pending debate on
the macroeconomic issues, we urge that the ultimate action by this Con
gress be coupled with a moratorium on future tax legislation for a reason
able period of time.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TAX
SIMPLIFICATION
The AICPA previously urged the appointment of a nonpartisan national
commission on tax simplification, and we reiterate that recommendation.
We urge that such a commission address the claims of both the proponents
and critics of the proposals, and render for the benefit of the public and
Congress findings on the impact of the proposed changes on the economy.
The commission would also appraise the complexities that would be intro
duced by the proposals of the Administration and by other proposed legis
lation. As stated in our earlier oral testimony, “nobody should have a
vested interest in tax complexity.”
We recommend that, in considering the proposals, the parties to the debate
reflect upon whether there is a compelling need to repudiate what has been
done by Congress in recent years to make the tax system more fair and simple.
Change, unless clearly needed, does not seem to be desirable.
9

IMMEDIATE NECESSARY REFORM
If it is determined that immediate change is necessary, the AICPA believes
that certain aspects of the proposals would be a welcome addition to the tax
system and urges that they be considered for adoption. We refer to the
proposed increases in the exemptions and zero bracket amounts, which
would remove a large number of low-income individuals from the system
and also would reduce the number of itemizers. These proposals are wholly
consistent with the AICPA’s desire for simplification and fairness.
Furthermore, we urge Congress to consider a series of safe harbors for
small businesses. Individual income tax reporting would be greatly sim
plified by this approach, since most small businesses are conducted in unin
corporated form and are reflected on the proprietor’s individual tax return.
In addition, we urge a concentrated effort to curtail the underground
economy. This is an area where tax reform should be concerned, but which
the Administration’s plan does not address. Although a reduction in mar
ginal tax rates may reduce the underreporting of income now present in the
system, the degree of its impact is unclear. In this connection, see the spe
cific comments and recommendations contained in the AICPA’s report on
Underreported Taxable Income: The Problem and Possible Solutions, Janu
ary 1983.
EFFECT ON STABILITY OF TAX SYSTEM
The plan adopts as its goals fairness, economic growth, and simplicity.
Lower tax rates and tax neutrality are also sought. There would be little
controversy if the individual proposals, contained within the plan, main
tained a harmonious balance among these goals; if economic disruptions
were kept to a bare minimum; and if economic growth was the reasonably
certain ultimate outcome. However, the proposals do embody trade-offs
and internal inconsistencies.
The proposals are a product of the choices between goals that are not
necessarily always compatible. The Administration acknowledges the pos
sibility of economic disruptions if this plan is enacted. Such economic dis
ruptions are likely because the tax system has historically been used to
offer incentives to encourage or discourage certain economic behavior.
Withdrawal of such incentives might have a reverse impact.
It should also be noted that justification for a proposal often refers to the
relatively small number of taxpayers who would be affected. We believe,
however, that such a statistic is only a partial analysis of the consequences
of its adoption. The issue should extend to the impact of repeal on the
industry to which the incentive relates, its workers, its suppliers, the states
in which the industry is located, and the like.
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The AICPA believes that we should strive to restore the respect of our
citizens for our tax laws. We also believe that this effort would be seriously
undermined if, in the face of predictions of economic disruptions, Congress
adopted a new “tax neutral” system, and thereafter forsakes the principle
of tax neutrality. Consequently, we believe it is urgent that Congress, in
evaluating the plan, determine whether tax neutrality is a principle by
which tax policy should be set. Congress may conclude that it will be bound
to grant tax incentives in the future, as it has in the past, to counter reces
sions, unemployment, stagnation of capital investment, or an energy crisis.
If it so decides, then adopting a neutral tax system as a temporary expedi
ent would, we believe, engender further taxpayer cynicism.
For example, the Administration has supported passage of enterprise
zone legislation, which clearly is a nonneutral tax incentive. Enterprise
zone legislation may be wholly justified by economic need. In the future,
other stimulants to taxpayer conduct may be justified by economic need.
Congress may pass a form of the Administration’s plan, find that certain
industries have been severely harmed, and then put together a tax incentive
package to mitigate the consequences. That too may be justified by eco
nomic need. We believe that such an approach would undermine confi
dence in our tax system.
We would urge both Congress and the Treasury to put a higher priority
on simplicity in the tax laws, especially for individuals and small busi
nesses. In the last twenty-two years, there have been nineteen major legis
lative changes in tax laws. Each change has not only complicated the Inter
nal Revenue Code but has also made its administration more complex and
has contributed to systemic instability. With each change the Internal Reve
nue Service must modify its tax processing system, its compliance pro
grams, its tax forms (often adding new forms), and its regulations (adding
to a backlog of regulations projects); it also must reeducate IRS agents and
inform taxpayers. In short, the flood of major tax law changes has contrib
uted substantially to a complex and confusing tax system.
EFFECT ON TAX ACCOUNTING
Within the tax accounting area of the Administration’s tax reform plan,
there are several issues that need to be evaluated: what principles are being
introduced into the tax accounting framework, is there a clear understand
ing of these principles, and are they being consistently applied?
The plan often selectively ignores the policies underlying historical in
come tax accounting; and the concepts that are being introduced into the
tax accounting framework are often confused with financial statement prin
ciples that serve a separate and distinct purpose. Furthermore, the plan
lacks consistent treatment and reasoning among the various proposals.
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Historically, tax accounting concepts have been based on revenue needs,
social goals, and practical applications that have developed over time.
These concepts change as goals and circumstances change.
Two concepts that appear to be advocated by the Administration for in
clusion or expansion within the tax accounting framework are matching of
income and expenses between or among taxpayers, and selective confor
mity between tax and financial statement accounting methods.1
Matching of income and deductions is cited as a reason for change in
chapter 8.01, which would revise the accounting rules for production costs,
and in chapter 8.03, which would limit use of the cash method of
accounting.
The historical concept of matching requires recognition of related in
come and expense items of a single taxpayer within the same accounting
period. The plan does acknowledge this concept but attempts instead to
apply it among multiple taxpayers.
Chapter 8.01 would require the capitalization of all business/production
expenses with four exceptions. In effect, this proposal would defer cur
rently deductible expenses. Chapter 8.03 would make accrual method ac
counting mandatory for many taxpayers, large and small, engaged in serv
ice businesses. The predominant effect on these taxpayers would be the
acceleration of income not yet received and possibly the deferral of ex
penses already paid. At the same time, the Administration’s plan, in chap
ter 8.04, proposes to repeal the reserve method of accounting for bad
debts, which does provide matching and follows financial statement ac
counting. The alternative, the specific charge-off method, results in a mis
matching of income and expense.
The second principle, conformity between tax and financial statement
accounting methods, is also inconsistently applied. For example, the pro
posal to limit use of the cash method of accounting states, “Because of its
inadequacies, the cash method of accounting is not considered to be in
accord with generally accepted accounting principles and, therefore, is not
permissible for financial accounting purposes.”2
In the very next proposal, chapter 8.04, the plan proposes to repeal the
reserve method of accounting for bad debts. The reserve method is in ac
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), yet the
plan fails to mention the need for conformity in this area. In fact, it seeks
nonconformity.
1Other accounting principles are also addressed within the plan but these two are the most
significant. Additional comments on tax accounting issues are included in the following spe
cific comments section.
2The cash method of accounting is considered another comprehensive method of accounting
and is permissible for financial statement purposes.
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This is further complicated by chapter 7.04, which would repeal the re
quirement for conformity between the financial statement and tax treat
ment of the LIFO method of inventory accounting. We support this pro
posal because it acknowledges that conformity between tax and financial
statement accounting is not necessarily appropriate in all cases. In fact, the
U.S. Supreme Court recently noted that the attraction to require confor
mity between accounting methods used for taxable income and preparing
financial statements is only superficial.3
Financial reporting to the creditors and owners of a business serves a
separate and distinct purpose from the reporting of taxable income. Be
cause of the different objectives between financial reporting and tax report
ing, accrual method tax accounting is often inconsistent with accrual ac
counting under GAAP. Financial accounting, in accordance with GAAP,
requires the recognition of the effects of a transaction on the assets and
liabilities of the business in the time period to which the transaction relates,
rather than when the cash is received or disbursed. Principles of tax ac
counting, which are often based on cash flow accounting, contradict this.
Taxable income for accrual method taxpayers rarely agrees with income for
accrual method financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP.
Through the blending of conformity and nonconformity proposals, and
matching and mismatching proposals, the underlying concepts of tax ac
counting become muddled. These proposals are a continuation of a dis
turbing trend of the past number of years: a movement to tax income at the
earlier of the date received or accrued, while deferring expense deduct
ibility until actually paid.
EFFECT ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF
GOVERNMENT
An issue that should be addressed in evaluating the Administration’s tax
reform plan is the impact of the plan on the interrelationship between
federal, state, and local governments.
The plan would cut indirect subsidies to state and local governments,
make it more difficult for state and local governments to raise or even col
lect taxes, and impede their ability to finance projects and programs. We
feel the desired federal and state relationship needs to be defined. In addi
tion, the implications and complications of this plan with regard to that
relationship need further study.

3Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
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Within an overall framework, the government must meet certain respon
sibilities to the people and generate adequate revenue to fund its activities.
The relationship of federal and state governments is defined by the division
of these responsibilities and the opportunities at each level to generate
revenue.
Throughout history, this relationship has been shaped and reshaped
through federal policy. In very recent years we have seen an impetus away
from a strong centralized national government and towards statism—states
taking greater responsibility for the needs of residents. This is especially
apparent from recent federal budget decisions. This tax reform plan fur
ther demonstrates the Administration’s intent to cut federal subsidies and
involvement and leave state governments with greater responsibility.
In analyzing the Administration’s plan, many implications, complica
tions, and technical problems must therefore be considered. For example:
how does this plan help or hinder the relationship of federal and state gov
ernments; how will state governments fund the additional responsibilities;
and what effect will this shift have on the economy? By examining several
of the proposals within the plan, these concerns are highlighted.
Chapter 3.09 of the Administration’s plan calls for the repeal of the de
duction for all state and local income taxes and other state and local taxes
not incurred in carrying on a trade, business, or income-producing activity.
This proposal will have the heaviest impact on taxpayers living in hightax states who itemize deductions. It could result in public pressure to
lower state tax rates to make taxpayers economically whole, or it might
result in population or business relocation to lower-tax states.
For high-tax states, this proposal could mean greater responsibility allo
cated from the federal government and impeded ability to raise tax revenue
(either from population or business outflow or from reduced tax rates). For
low-tax states, this proposal could mean greater responsibility for existing
residents, as well as inflowing residents, and greater difficulty in increasing
tax rates to meet these new demands.
This proposal coupled with recent federal budget decisions would greatly
restrict state governments’ financial ability to meet increasing
responsibilities.
Chapter 3.06 of the Administration’s plan would require the inclusion in
income of all unemployment compensation and all cash payments for dis
ability from workers’ compensation and black lung (with limited excep
tions). Presently, most of these benefits are untaxed. If this proposal is
enacted, these benefits may have to be increased to yield the same after-tax
dollars. With the current trend towards statism, this responsibility would
probably shift to the state. This proposal would represent another financial
burden to be placed on the state and local governments.
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Chapter 11.01 would repeal the tax-exempt status of interest on state and
local government obligations if more than one percent of the proceeds were
used directly or indirectly by any person other than a state or local govern
ment. Under an exception to the general rule, use of tax-exempt financed
facilities by a nongovernment person would be permissible if the facilities
were available for use by the general public on the same basis. This pro
posal would affect industrial development bonds (IDBs), mortgage subsidy
bonds, and other nongovernmental bonds.
State governments now use IDBs to enhance incentives or offset detri
mental factors, in order to attract business into the state. IDBs are also
used to encourage private business to perform public services. This pro
posal may force many states to perform public services previously per
formed by private business, and—particularly in concert with repealing
employees’ state tax deductions—may also result in a shift in business from
high- to low-tax-rate states.
This proposal would impede state governments’ abilities to finance their
projects and programs, and could have dramatic effects on the economy as
a whole.
Chapter 10.02 would deny all (rather than 80 percent) of deductions by
banks, thrifts, and other financial institutions of interest payments alloca
ble to the purchase or carrying of tax-exempt obligations.
Another issue not addressed in the Administration’s plan, but which
should be considered, is “piggybacking”—where states tie their definition
of tax base to the federal definition of tax base. If this plan is adopted by
the federal government, there will be provisions within the package that
may not be acceptable to state governments. These provisions would be
revenue losers at the state level and would require either an increase in
state taxes or an adjustment to the federal tax base in determining the state
tax base. The latter is more likely but would increase overall tax complexity
rather than simplifying tax reporting requirements for taxpayers.
States currently exchange tax data with the federal government to assure
tax compliance, thus more adjustments to the federal base will require
additional independent verification by the state. Additional adjustments to
the federal base will result in an increased audit burden, and thus financial
burden, for the states.
In addition, while we support the reduction of federal marginal tax rates,
it should be recognized that their implementation will make tax-exempt
state and local bonds less desirable. The below-market rate of interest cur
rently paid on these bonds, will have to be increased to compete with exist
ing market rates, adding further cost burdens to state and local
government.
The Administration’s plan will affect the interrelationship of governmen
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tal units, and will require a new approach to state and municipal finance.
Congress should have a high degree of confidence in the likely economic
and behavioral effects of these provisions before enacting them.
EFFECT ON SIMPLIFICATION
Much of the current complexity in the Internal Revenue Code and the tax
system is due to constant, major tax law changes. Simplicity is enhanced by
the application of consistent tax rules and will be difficult to achieve if these
rules are in constant transformation.
In addition to representing yet another potential change to the system,
the current proposals also contain provisions that clearly add to the current
level of complexity. This complexity is highlighted by an examination of
several of the proposals.
The plan eliminates one itemized deduction, state and local taxes, and
combines various business and miscellaneous deductions, which are then
subject to a reduction of one percent of modified adjusted gross income.
Some taxpayers will realize simplification through an increase in the zero
bracket amount since itemizing will not be beneficial for them. However,
many of these taxpayers will still need to calculate whether itemizing is
more beneficial and will still need to maintain records for that purpose.
Also, the new miscellaneous deduction category requires a further
calculation.
In addition, more complicated rules for the deductibility of interest ex
pense are proposed. Some taxpayers will have to calculate net investment
income in order to determine the amount of interest, other than principal
home mortgage interest, he or she may deduct.
The plan also proposes revisions in the alternative minimum tax (AMT)
for both corporate and noncorporate taxpayers. Although we agree with
the policy objectives of both a corporate and an individual minimum tax,
these particular proposals unnecessarily complicate the computation of the
preference items. The tightening of the AMT under these proposals will
also increase the number of taxpayers subject to AMT. Affected taxpayers
will be required to apply two different sets of rules to the same items of
income and expense. While some additional complexity for the sake of
greater equity is acceptable, this proposal creates significant complexity,
and the price is too great. Nevertheless, if AMTs are pursued, rules for
broad uniform concepts should be developed.
The proposal to deny a rate reduction benefit attributable to excess de
preciation, with its inherent retroactivity, imposes additional recordkeep
ing requirements and contributes to complexity. Moreover, this concept of
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multiple-year retroactivity violates fundamental principles of fairness and
has not heretofore been a part of our tax system.
The proposals affecting the taxation of the investment in business prop
erty and capital assets, according to the Administration, are geared to
wards providing “incentives in a relatively neutral manner in order to limit
investment distortions created under current law.” Moreover by so doing,
these provisions affecting depreciation, capital gains, “excess” depreciation
recapture as well as interest limitations and the 10 percent dividend paid
deduction unnecessarily add more recordkeeping and complexity to an al
ready complex area of the code.
If change is indeed needed in this area, there are other alternatives avail
able that will not add to the complexity of the code. For example, signifi
cant relief from recordkeeping requirements can be obtained through uti
lizing the previous depreciation guidelines and providing open-end,
multiyear, multiple asset accounts for broad classes of depreciable prop
erty. This system would be desirable because it would provide simplicity for
the actual depreciation calculation, prescribed lives, no salvage values, no
indexation, no separate accounting for retirement, ease of recordkeeping,
and the half-year convention.
The Administration acknowledges the simplicity of this “open end” de
preciation method when it states on page 151 of its proposal that “consid
eration would be given to simplifying taxpayer accounting by permitting an
election to maintain open accounts for certain classes of CCRS property.”
An open-end depreciation system would aid the Administration’s objec
tives of neutral investment incentives and the mitigation of inflation. Fur
thermore, the open-end system would add some simplification.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS
CHAPTER 7. REDUCE M ARGINAL TAX RATES
1.01—Reduce Marginal Tax Rates
The proposed reduction in the number of tax brackets from 14 to 3 would
simplify the tax law. We support the concepts of base broadening and
lowering of tax rates provided they are consistent with sound fiscal and
economic policy. However, the size of the rate reductions and the number
of tax brackets should be further evaluated in terms of fairness among
taxpayers.
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CHAPTER 2. INCREASE FAIRNESS FOR
FAMILIES
2.01—Increase Zero Bracket Amount and Personal
Exemptions
This proposal achieves simplification by reducing the number of individuals
who will be required to file tax returns and pay tax. A fairer means of
achieving this goal and simplifying the tax structure would be a standard tax
credit instead of an increased personal exemption deduction. This would
also provide greater equity to lower income taxpayers since credits provide
equal benefits, while deductions provide greater benefits to taxpayers in
higher marginal tax brackets.
We recommend consideration of a standard tax credit in place of the
personal exemption. If that is not feasible, then we would support this
proposal.
2.02—Elderly, Blind, and Disabled Credit
This proposal is an excellent approach to replace personal exemptions for
the elderly, blind, and disabled with a corresponding credit.
The disability credit provisions are simpler and more equitable than the
current statutes. They will increase benefits to those who need them most
by increasing the “initial base amount,” by being a credit instead of a de
duction, and by phasing out increases as income rises. The computation,
however, is still complex. Further simplification could be achieved by doing
away with the exemption, dropping the proposed credit, and just raising
the threshold level for taxation. Thus, provisions 2.01 and 2.02 could be
made to work in tandem.
2.03—Repeal Two-Earner Deduction
This provision simplifies the code at the price of reduced equity. Flattening
the rates will alleviate some of the “marriage penalty,” but will not compen
sate for the loss of this provision.
We oppose this proposal. It affects a very large and very important group
of taxpayers and involves what is perceived as an extremely significant issue
of fairness.
2.05—Replace Child and Dependent Care Credit With
Deduction
By replacing a credit with a deduction, the underlying social benefit of this
tax policy is diluted. The desirability of this dilution must be analyzed in
terms of the primary purpose of the credit.
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If the primary purpose of the credit is to assist low bracket wage earners
with dependents, it would seem that no social or other justifiable goals are
achieved by permitting either a deduction or a credit to “high bracket”
wage earners. For this reason, we oppose the proposal. To achieve socially
justifiable goals, this relief provision should be retained as a credit and
phased out with increasing levels of income.

CHAPTER 3. M AKE THE SYSTEM MORE
NEUTRAL AND FAIR
3.02—Repeal $5,000 Exclusion for
Employer-Provided. Death Benefits
This proposal would repeal the $5,000 exclusion for employer-furnished
death benefits because it is considered an artificial preference for compen
sation paid in this form. There is also confusion concerning the employee’s
family’s tax treatment of the $5,000 death benefit.
We agree with the proposal to repeal this provision in order to simplify
the Internal Revenue Code. Even though it is not a complex rule, it is of
little consequence to taxpayers in general. Unless there is substantial rea
son for a special tax provision, it should be eliminated.
3.06—Repeal Exclusion for Unemployment and
Disability Payments
The non- or partial taxation of these payments has provided a subsidy from
the U.S. Treasury. From a fiscal standpoint, there appears to be no good
reason why this subsidy should continue since it is in reality a wage sub
stitute. Workmen’s compensation is also a wage substitute and should be
similarly taxed, but only for future injuries (as provided by the proposal).
We also note that the proposal is unclear concerning the treatment of dis
ability payments where the individual taxpayer, rather than the employer,
has paid the insurance premium.
No arguments or justifications appear to exist, however, for taxing black
lung benefits and service-related payments received for injuries previously
incurred. Prospective application is fairer and would cause much less social
and economic upheaval. It is unrealistic to assume, as the proposal does,
that these types of benefits can be automatically adjusted.
An issue of fairness may also exist relating to taxing payments at a time
when the recipient is otherwise already unemployed or disabled.
We support this provision provided black lung and service-related bene
fits are taxed on a prospective-injury basis only.
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3.07—Limit Scholarship and Fellowship Exclusion
The current provisions are complex and spawn much tax controversy. One
would expect any reform to simplify and reduce or eliminate the controver
sies. The proposed limit will not accomplish this. Arguments would still
persist over degree versus non-degree status, what portions of a grant re
late to excluded expenses, what are incidental expenses, and so on. Sim
plification will not be achieved; indeed, this complex area may be made
more complex.
Significant social and economic questions are raised by including or ex
cluding awards or grants. Public policy may favor the granting of schol
arships to academically deserving students, regardless of need. On the
other hand, those who are in need should not be further taxed. To do so
would seem to run contrary to the original rationale underlying the exclu
sion as it now exists.
In order to achieve the social goal of fostering education, a “sliding”
deduction should be retained for all scholarships and fellowships. Thus, the
higher the recipient’s income, including the award, the lower the exclusion.
Although this would introduce a new computation into the code, the con
troversies over work requirements, degree status, and so on would be
eliminated.
3.08—Repeal Exclusion for Prizes and Awards
This provision will promote horizontal equity. The receipt of such prize or
award should be treated as taxable income, subject to a de minimus
exclusion.
We support this provision if modified to retain an exclusion for a de
minimus amount.
3.09—Repeal Deduction of State and Local Taxes
We oppose the Administration’s proposal to eliminate the itemized deduc
tion for state and local taxes.
To require individuals to pay an income tax on the portion of their in
come applied to the payment of state income taxes is, in effect, double
taxation. Furthermore, state and local income taxes, and to a lesser extent
real estate property taxes and sales taxes, constitute an assessment that is
broadly applied and over which individuals may, in fact, exercise very little
control. Many individuals are not truly free to choose the jurisdiction in
which they are taxed.
It has been argued in support of elimination of the deduction that two
thirds of Americans do not itemize, and therefore receive no benefit from
the state and local tax deduction. The reason these Americans do not
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itemize deductions is that their state and local taxes, when combined with
their other itemized deductions, do not exceed the zero bracket amount.
Thus, they are getting up to the full benefit of a deduction for the state and
local taxes they pay, through the availability of the zero bracket amount. Is
it then fair to deny the higher tax jurisdiction taxpayer the benefit of de
ductibility for the state and local taxes he or she pays?
It can also be argued that state and local income taxes are a cost of
earning income and as a result should be deductible. Other such costs (for
example, clothing and commuting) often can be increased or reduced
based on the worker’s preferences. State and local income taxes, however,
are a fixed cost that cannot be altered at the worker’s will and therefore
differ from these other nondeductible costs of earning a living.
If the deduction for state and local taxes is eliminated, high-tax states will
shift to other forms of taxation, thereby substantially diminishing the actual
federal tax revenues to be derived from elimination of the deduction. States
such as Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, and North Dakota currently
fund certain state programs, such as education, by allowing a credit against
state taxes for contributions to selected educational institutions. Such con
tributions to selected educational institutions are deductible as charitable
contributions at the federal level. State taxing schemes such as these will
most certainly be expanded and improved upon if the deduction for state
and local taxes is eliminated.
3.11—Limit Deduction for Entertainment and Business
Meal Expenses
The entertainment expense deduction is an area susceptible to abuse and
perceived to be unfair. Accordingly, we support the proposed elimination
of entertainment expense deductions.
We have different views, however, with regard to the proposed limit on
deductions for business meals. We believe the problem of abuses in the
business meal area should be addressed through stiffer audit techniques
and stronger enforcement to encourage compliance with the present rules,
not by an arbitrary limitation on meal deductions. (It should also be noted
that limits on deductibility of business meals will complicate payroll and
income tax reporting.)
3.13—Adjust Tax Rate on Unearned Income of Minor
Children
Under this proposal, unearned income received by minor children under
the age of fourteen attributable to property received from the child’s par
ents would be taxed at the parents’ marginal tax rate. The Administration’s
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plan states that income splitting to utilize lower marginal tax rates under
mines the progressive rate structure. It further contends that this is a source
of unfairness in the current tax system since the ability to shift investment
income to children primarily benefits the wealthy. However, the wealthy
will be able to mitigate the effects of this proposal, by either causing gifts to
be made by grandparents and other relatives, rather than parents, or defer
ring major gifts until the minor child reaches fourteen years of age.
The proposal increases the complexity, rather than simplifying the deter
mination of a minor’s income tax liability. Under current law, when deter
mining the taxable income of a minor who is a dependent, it is necessary to
divide the income between earned and unearned income. The proposal
further complicates this existing structure by creating two categories of un
earned income, labeled “unearned income from a qualified segregated ac
count,” and “unearned income attributable to property transferred by par
ents.” The proposal places a premium on good bookkeeping and creates a
trap for the uninformed.
We oppose this proposal as it adds undue complexity and does not repre
sent a significant improvement over the existing system of taxation.
3.14—Revise Grantor and Non-Grantor Trust Taxation
This proposal would completely change the basic principles of the income
taxation of trusts. We have serious concerns about this proposal and believe
it should not be included in a comprehensive tax reform package for the
following reasons:
1. One of the aims of the proposal is to prevent the loss of revenue by
the creation of multiple trusts by the same grantor. The 1984 Tax Re
form Act previously added section 643(e) to the Internal Revenue
Code, which requires the consolidation for income tax purposes of
multiple trusts for the same beneficiaries. Consequently, we feel fur
ther legislation is unnecessary in this area.
2. With respect to trusts that accumulate income, the reintroduction of
the capital gains throwback rule and the elimination of the exception
of the throwback rules for minors would add substantial complexity to
the law. These provisions were previously included in the law but were
repealed in 1976 because of their complexity. The current rules should
not be changed.
3. The proposed changes in the rules for grantor trusts would be unfair,
would add undue complexity, and are not warranted.
a. The elimination of the Clifford Trust rules would be unfair. Al
though the wealthy are in a position to make outright gifts or trans
fers in trusts, those with more moderate means use a short-term or
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Clifford Trust. In the short-term trust, the assets are returned to
the grantor at the termination of the trust. Generally, short-term
trusts are used when a person wants to benefit a child or other
relative but cannot afford to permanently give up the property.
b. Under current law, a trustee of an irrevocable trust may be given
discretion to shift income among beneficiaries or, where necessary,
to accumulate income. Income that is accumulated is taxed to the
trust. Income that is distributed is taxed to the beneficiary who
receives it. The proposal would not allow a distribution deduction
for this type of discretionary trust during the grantor’s life. These
trusts are generally used to take care of dependents with dis
abilities or those having difficulties handling their own affairs. If
the income-producing property were given outright to these bene
ficiaries, the income would be taxed to them. We feel the same
result should follow if the assets are put in an irrevocable trust.
Delaying the deductibility by the trust of such distributions until
after the death of the grantor is not warranted.
c. The proposals would be effective for all trusts beginning in 1986.
Changes as extensive as these should be phased in over a period of
time. People should be given time to amend current trusts and wills
to take into account the new provisions. Further, existing irrev
ocable grantor trusts should be grandfathered.
4. The proposals would violate the right of privacy and confidentiality of
tax return information. Creators of trusts and the trustees of all trusts
created by them would have to share information pertaining to their
taxable income in order to properly compute tax. This will have par
ticularly unsettling ramifications in these days of frequent divorces
and multiple families because of trusts created for former spouses and
children. Additionally, there could be a reduction in the use of thirdparty independent trustees because of the need for the grantor to
provide them with information about his or her income.
5. The preparation of trust returns could be delayed, or taxes paid at
unfairly high rates, if the grantor or one trustee lacked a single item of
information to complete the preparation of his or her returns. Also,
presumably, a change as the result of an IRS audit to the grantor’s
return would require the filing of amended fiduciary income tax
returns.
6. The proposals disregard a long-standing principle of tax law—namely,
income is taxable to the owner of the property generating it. By pro
posing to tax all trusts at the grantor’s rates, the separate legal entity
of the trust is not given full recognition. Further, these proposals
would thwart and frustrate the many valid non-tax uses of trusts.
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We oppose this proposal because of the undue complexity it would add.
However, we recognize that abuses in the trust area exist and that reform is
needed. This problem area should be studied with a view to recommending
changes to curb identified abuses and achieve fairness.
3.15—Revise Income Taxation of Estates
The main thrust of this proposal is to eliminate “abuse,” with respect to
estate income taxation, resulting from the judicious election of fiscal years
for estates and trusts. If planned properly under current law, it is possible
to defer the payment of income tax for more than two years. We agree that
the ability to elect a taxable year-end different than the decedent’s can be
considered an abuse and should be eliminated.
The proposal would also extend a decedent’s final taxable year to the end
of the taxable year in which his death occurs. Distributions to beneficiaries
during this first extended period would not result in a distribution deduc
tion on the decedent’s final return. The estate, as a separate taxpayer,
would in effect, come into existence on the first day of the taxable year
beginning after the decedent’s final, extended taxable year.
While we can agree with the change in year-end for decedents, we be
lieve that an income tax deduction should be allowed for distributions from
a decedent’s estate, as well as from trusts, in the year of death. Income
distributed from an estate for family support should be taxed to the recip
ient. Further, trust income, which is required to be distributed after death
to another, should also be taxed to the recipient. Not allowing the deduc
tion may delay the distribution of needed funds for the support of family
members or other beneficiaries of an estate or trust.
Although we agree with that portion of the proposal pertaining to fiscal
years of estates, we disagree with other substantive sections that would add
undue complexity and inequity to the present law.

CHAPTER 4. REDUCE RECORDKEEPING AND
COM PLEXITY
4.01—Impose Floor on Employee Business Expense
and Other Miscellaneous Deductions
The proposal to limit miscellaneous deductions appears to be one of sim
plifying enforcement, rather than simplifying the tax law itself. We believe
that if an employee has a legitimate business expense, he or she should be
allowed to deduct that expense along with others incurred in producing
income. The rationale that these items should not be deductible under a
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one percent of adjusted gross income floor does not simplify the tax law
because it still requires that taxpayers consider these deductions to deter
mine whether or not they will exceed the one percent floor. The major
implied advantage seems to be that the IRS would not have to audit as
many deductions. Although the proposal would broaden the tax base and
thus allow lower marginal rates, it would be inequitable to those taxpayers
who have ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in producing income.
The inequity created outweighs the advantage of broadening the tax base.
We oppose this proposal.
4.04—Repeal Adoption Expense Deduction
This proposal would simplify the code. It is doubtful whether most couples
consider the deduction as a major factor in determining whether to adopt
children with special needs.
We support this proposal.
4.05—Repeal Income Averaging
The complete repeal of the income averaging provisions would certainly
result in simplification, since the computations are not easily made or un
derstood. Furthermore, litigation would be reduced, since eligibility and
base-year income issues would disappear.
Since the recent changes to the base-year and computational method,
the current provision arguably could be seen as benefitting primarily highincome earners.
Also, the distortions and inequities in tax paid, when the top bracket was
70 percent will not be present when rates are lowered and the brackets are
expanded.
We support this proposal if accompanied by rate reduction and the ex
pansion of brackets.
4.06—Simplify Penalty Provisions
We agree that the penalty provisions of the code should be restructured to
provide simplification, ease of administration, and fairness in their applica
tion. Moreover, the plan eliminates a significant amount of the vagueness
contained in “Treasury I.” However, as pointed out below, the proposal
would still be inequitable in certain respects, and thus counterproductive to
the fairness objective.
The plan does not seem to address some important penalties, such as
that for underpayment of estimated tax. To be effective, it should clarify
which of the present penalties are included.
The proposal also does not contain a provision allowing the waiver of
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penalties by district directors or others for reasonable cause. While it may
be simpler to have a system that does not allow for the waiver of penalties,
such a system cannot be considered fair or equitable.
Failure to file information return or furnish statement. Underlying the entire
simplification program, there seems to be an increasing tendency to shift
much of the burden of reporting and collection to business. Further, busi
ness incurs costs that continue to increase as reporting requirements be
come stricter. Already, filers of certain forms 1099 reporting payments to
more than fifty payees must file these returns via magnetic tape. Increased
matching—particularly instantaneous matching for tax computation under
the Administration’s concept of a return-free system—will probably require
most businesses to use this method of reporting. The costs to a small or
even medium-sized business could be prohibitive.
Under the concept of the return-free system, matching of documents by
the IRS would be mandatory. However, based on the matching process in
existence currently, many improvements must occur. Documents and
notices of additional tax due are frequently processed for returns that have
accurately reported the correct income.
Because of these problems, the proposed penalty ($100 for each com
bined failure to file/furnish) with no maximum is potentially onerous, espe
cially for small business. The present $50,000 penalty cap is therefore
necessary.
Furnishing “incorrect information” on a return or statement. The provision
is too vague. For example, the effect of filing an amended return has not, as
we see it, been considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Cost-of-collection charge. This provision is also too vague. Does it imply a
set fee or the actual incremental cost to the government in each individual
circumstance? Will a taxpayer be charged $1,000, for example, to collect a
$10 penalty? Would there be a cost of collecting the prior cost of collecting?
Would the penalty be assessed if the tax were not collected?
Effective date. The proposed effective date—returns due on or after Janu
ary 1, 1986—provides taxpayers, particularly those who must make altera
tions to their data processing systems and equipment, with inadequate
time. We suggest that the effective date be restated to taxable years begin
ning after the date of enactment.
CONCLUSION
The proposals could be the basis for restructuring the penalty provisions, if
there were explanatory definitions and examples of application that are not
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subject to various interpretations. In addition, to promote fairness, a provi
sion to waive a penalty for reasonable cause must be provided.
Since a major reason for restructuring the penalty provisions is to in
crease compliance, we suggest the IRS increase its informational and edu
cational activities so that taxpayers are aware of their responsibilities (and
the consequences of their failure to comply).

CHAPTER 5. SIMPLIFY THE SYSTEM OF
FILING
5.01—Study Return-Free System
The bottom line of tax simplification requires consideration of changes in
tax forms: how many forms, how complicated are they, is there ease of
preparation by individuals, and is there improved processing by the IRS?
To the extent our tax system removes taxpayers from the return-filing proc
ess, simplification has occurred. This is clearly evident in the sales tax sys
tem where retailers collect, pay over the tax, and file the return. The goal
of a return-free income tax system for individuals is theoretically desirable;
however, we believe it can be done only to a limited extent and even then
with certain shortcomings as described below:
1. Judgment is required with respect to selecting accounting methods for
taxpayers, for example: accrual vs. cash, inventory methods, bad debt
timing, depreciation, installment sales, repair vs. capital, and so on.
2. Government policy has relied and will continue to rely on the tax
system to provide social influence and relief through deductions for
such items as charitable contributions, mortgage interest, medical ex
penses, and retirement savings, as well as directing economic invest
ment by providing special tax incentives.
3. Unreported income arising basically out of cash transactions cannot
be addressed in a return-free system. For example, the estimated in
come tax liability on unreported income by tax filers alone in 1981
was $52 billion. A matter of concern to us is the possibility that a
return-free system will encourage continuance and even expansion of
such tax evasion.
Therefore, we believe a return-free system can only work with the lowincome segment of taxpayers. Indeed, the Administration’s proposal recog
nizes this with its emphasis on increased personal exemptions and reduc
tion in eligible itemized deductions, providing a “standard” tax calculation
based on wages, interest, and dividends. Removing an estimated 66 per
cent of all taxpayers from tax return filing would be attainable. The obvious
shortcoming, however, is the extent to which this segment contributes to
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the some $52 billion of unreported tax liability. Worse still, how many in
this group will be encouraged to move into the unreported income segment
via cash and bartering transactions because they no longer have to file a
return?
Under the concept of the return-free system, matching of documents by
the IRS would be mandatory. However, based on the matching process in
existence currently, many improvements must occur. Again and again, doc
uments and notices of additional tax due are processed for returns that
correctly report the income. It is currently difficult for the IRS to deter
mine that income is reported. Corrected 1099s rarely are processed and
matched correctly, which creates problems for taxpayers. The taxpayer re
ceives notices of tax due from failure by the IRS to match the items
correctly.
Payroll and information returns are filed at different times with different
agencies in different locations. Some are paper returns, others are on mag
netic tape. Feeding this data into the system so that every service center
would have access to every piece of information nationwide could not un
der present (or forseeable) technology be accomplished to allow timely
calculation of tax liability. If a taxpayer knew that six to nine months or
more would elapse before a refund would be received, would any prudent
person elect the “return free” system? If, on the other hand, he has to file a
submission form with all the information enclosed to assure an accurate
calculation of his tax liability, why not do it himself? Also, many taxpayers
will want to calculate tax liability both with and without itemized deduc
tions before deciding whether to elect the return-free system.
Anyone who owes taxes would make the election, but the government
would stand to lose (at least in the first few years) by not collecting monies
due until the calculation was made several months later, posing questions of
penalty and interest on payments made after the due date. If the liability is
not determined until, say September, how can any penalty be assessed?
This would favor one segment of the taxpaying public over another and
unfairly penalize the 34 percent of the taxpayers who calculate and pay
their taxes timely.
We support the concept of a return-free system; however, the implemen
tation presents a number of difficulties. We believe that prior to any imple
mentation of a return-free system the following should be considered:
1. Expanding optical character recognition (OCR) capability at IRS
service centers (as per form 1040EZ). Develop OCR technology as
fully as possible.
2. Undertaking significant testing projects around the country to assess
the feasibility of a return-free system for low-income taxpayers.
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CHAPTER 6. REVISE THE TAXATION OF
CORPORATE INCOME
6.02—Reduce Double Taxation of Corporate Earnings
Distributed to Shareholders
This proposal would provide corporations with a deduction for 10 percent
of dividends paid to shareholders in an attempt to mitigate the double taxa
tion of corporate earnings.
We support the concepts of parity and relief from double taxation; how
ever, we cannot support this proposal. The 10 percent proposed deduction
is too insignificant to justify the additional complexity and recordkeeping
this proposal would require.
Additional Recordkeeping. This proposal does nothing to alleviate the de
tailed records currently required to determine earnings and profits under
section 312, but it would add additional rules and regulations for the ad
ministration of a qualified dividend account (QDA).
Every corporation would be required to set up a QDA. The account
would be increased each year by the taxable income of the corporation,
decreased by taxable income that does not result in a tax liability due to the
application of a credit, decreased by dividends paid (but not below zero),
and decreased by liquidating and redeeming distributions.
The QDA recordkeeping requirements would not be as straightforward
as they seem. For example, the calculation to decrease the account by the
taxable income that does not result in a tax liability due to the application
of a credit could be quite complex.
Another area of potential complexity is the treatment of a dividend de
duction that results in a net operating loss carryback. Although this sounds
simple in principle, it may be difficult to apply.
Additional Reporting Requirements. A corporation paying dividends to an
other corporation would submit a report to the recipient stating what por
tion of the dividend was paid out of the distributing corporation’s QDA.
This additional reporting requirement would be necessary so that the re
ceiving corporation would know if the 100 percent exclusion, the 90 percent
exclusion, or something in between was appropriate.
Complexity in Redemptions and Liquidations. A literal reading of this pro
posal implies that if the QDA were adequate in amount, the QDA would
be reduced by the full amount of a distribution made in redemption. In a
situation where a redeemed shareholder was merely recovering the tax
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basis in the stock, an unintended outcome would result. Thus, additional
complex rules would be required to correctly handle redemption dis
tributions.
Complexity Involving Reorganizations. The proposal indicates that rules
would be provided to govern the transferability of the QDA in mergers and
acquisitions. This will necessitate rules similar to those currently in effect
to control trafficking of net operating loss carryovers. Structuring the rules
to prohibit trafficking in QDAs will probably prove every bit as difficult
and controversial as the long struggle to reform section 382.
Elimination of Additional Complexity. If the goal is to avoid double taxa
tion of corporate income, a simple solution is the complete elimination of
the corporate income tax. However, such a solution would obviously have
far-reaching political implications and is probably not practical at this time
of high federal deficits.
Summary Comments. We question whether this provision will accomplish
the goals outlined. First, the proposal notes that the current law encour
ages debt over equity financing. Since interest is deductible, the aggregate
tax of the corporation and investor cannot exceed 50 percent. This is in
contrast to equity where the aggregate tax, because of double taxation, can
exceed 70 percent. We agree that this 20 percent spread between the two
methods does encourage debt financing; however, we question whether the
proposal would correct this bias. Even if the lower individual rates, lower
corporate rates, and dividend deduction of the Treasury plan are accepted,
there would still be a spread of 18 percent favoring debt financing. (This
merely reflects the fact that the deduction for dividends is only one tenth of
the dividend paid.)
Additionally, there are other reasons why debt is preferred over equity
investments: debt is generally senior in liquidation rights; it usually repre
sents a fixed income stream; and in many cases it is less sensitive to changes
in value due to market conditions. Finally, and perhaps more important, an
investor can liquidate debt without any question of whether the distribu
tion is ordinary income in the form of a dividend.
A second reason offered for the change is that under current law it is
difficult to distinguish debt from equity. Nothing in this proposal would
clarify that admittedly vague distinction. For the reasons stated above,
there will still be incentives for investors to want to hold debt, and there
will still be questions of whether that debt is really equity.
The proposal also notes that in considering a dividend, corporations are
concerned with whether their shareholders are low- or relatively highmarginal-rate taxpayers. In our experience, this is a purely theoretical ar
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gument. Most corporations do not concern themselves with this question,
and, even if they did, the proposal only mitigates the problem. It does not
change it.
Finally, the proposal states that the current law discourages the use of the
corporate form of business because of double taxation. Again, this is a
theoretical consideration. We believe that the primary purpose for choos
ing a form other than the corporate form is to pass business losses directly
through to investors. This proposal would not alter that incentive.
To the extent this proposal eliminates some of the double taxation, it
would benefit corporations and shareholders. However, we do not expect it
would result in a sudden change of preference away from S corporations or
the partnership form of business.
6.03—Repeal $100/$200 Dividend Income Exclusion
Repeal of the dividend income exclusion would result in some simplifica
tion. This change would affect individual taxpayers who are investors in
equity instruments. As an incentive to stimulate investments in stock, the
dividend exclusion is too small to be considered a viable incentive. The
effect of its repeal on investment strategies or stock market performance
would be nominal.
We support this proposal.

CHAPTER 7—REVISE TAXATION OF BUSINESS
PROPERTY AN D CAPITAL
ASSETS
7.01—Adopt New Capital Cost Recovery System
Despite the Administration’s efforts to redress perceived imbalances be
tween the capital-intensive and labor-intensive segments of the economy,
we must oppose the proposed new Capital Cost Recovery System (CCRS).
Recognizing the concerns for cost of capital expressed last fall in Treasury
I, as well as this spring by the Administration, we find the trade-off in
complexity unacceptable—particularly on behalf of smaller and medium
sized businesses.
The intent of CCRS is, per the proposals, to provide neutral investment
incentives. However, since their promulgation three months ago, studies
have begun to appear questioning how neutral an incentive CCRS repre
sents. We are not attempting to “take sides” with respect to the Administra
tion’s or opposing views; however, it is our view that a depreciation system
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as complex as CCRS carries with it a burden to demonstrate it will accom
plish the economic ends Congress expects in enacting it.
We believe the likely economic results of CCRS are far from clear. How
ever, we also recognize congressional interest and the Administration’s in
terest in revising the capital cost incentives originally enacted in the Eco
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. In our judgment, the goals of scaling back
capital cost allowances can be achieved with relative simplicity by making
changes within the current ACRS provisions: lengthening recovery peri
ods, allowing open-ended accounts, and repealing the investment tax credit
(see below).
CCRS will be highly complex for the most sophisticated business. Imple
mentation for the small or medium-sized enterprise will create substantial
frustration. Its goals should be addressed in a more manageable fashion.
7.02—Repeal Investment Tax Credit
We agree with the proposed repeal of the investment tax credit (ITC). The
ITC provisions are complex and the evidence is inconclusive whether the
ITC is a significant incentive to spur investment or productivity. This reve
nue-raising proposal is a necessary trade-off for other favorable tax reform
measures, such as reduced marginal tax rates.
7.03—Revise Tax Treatment of Capital Gains
This proposal is extremely complex. Indexing basis for inflation, while aca
demically appealing, is a complicated step and would result in uncertainty
for taxpayers regarding the amount of gain or loss from year to year. De
pending on the date chosen for computing the inflation figure, the final
amount might not be known until after the transaction is completed.
Another complexity is the future election to index or to use a favorable
capital gains rate. This election replaces the current one-step computation
process with three steps—two computations plus a comparison. Further,
the new definitions and distinctions between different kinds of assets do not
lead to simplification of tax administration and preparation.
Other related items to be considered include the following:
1. Taxing the appreciation portion over cost of depreciable property as
ordinary income would not be needed if indexation is not enacted.
2. The introduction of new distinctions among assets for capital gains
purposes will produce litigation and much confusion—business vs.
personal vs. investment.
3. The present section 1231 could be changed to provide consistent gain/
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loss treatment. This would permit the elimination of the complex, and
unnecessary, rule requiring the five-year look back and subsequent
recapture.
7.04—Index Inventories
This proposal would repeal the requirement, in effect since 1939, for con
formity between tax and financial statement inventory methods where
LIFO is used for tax purposes. As stated in the report, the requirement has
hindered adoption of the LIFO method, even though this method better
accounts for the effects of inflation than does FIFO. The conformity re
quirement has also caused unnecessary uncertainty and complexity in ac
counting for inventories.
We support the provision to repeal the LIFO conformity requirement.
The Administration also proposes an additional method, “Indexed
FIFO,” for valuing inventories and calculating the cost of goods sold. Tax
payers using either LIFO or FIFO could, as an alternative to their current
inventory valuation method, elect to utilize such new Indexed FIFO
method.
Under the new method, the inventory value of cost of goods sold, first
determined under the FIFO method, would be adjusted annually using
inflation factors based on a federal government price index (such as the
Consumer Price Index). An additional deduction based on the percentage
increase in the index applied to the beginning inventory (or ending in
ventory if lower) would be permitted. This annual adjustment is intended
to increase the taxpayer’s cost of goods sold up to their current value in
inflationary periods, thereby lowering gross profits and adjusting taxable
income to reflect only real economic gains. Inflationary gains would be
removed from the tax base under such treatment.
The proposed Indexed FIFO method, which would only be available to
offset inflation occurring in taxable years beginning on or after January 1,
1987, could be adopted by taxpayers currently using either LIFO or FIFO.
Adoption of the Indexed FIFO method, although a change in method of
accounting, would not require prior consent of the IRS. However, it would
require taxpayers currently using LIFO to recapture any LIFO reserves.
The report tacitly recognizes that the increased tax liability resulting from
such mandatory recapture would severely limit the attractiveness of the
Indexed FIFO method for taxpayers currently using LIFO.
We support the Indexed FIFO concept as another means of adjusting for
inflation as LIFO does. Indexed FIFO may be an acceptable alternative for
the many smaller businesses that may not have adopted LIFO because of
cost, complexity, and uncertainty. While we support the Indexed FIFO
concept, we suggest certain modifications to the proposal.
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We believe that the annual index adjustment to cost of goods sold should
be based entirely on beginning inventory and not on a reduced amount in
those cases where ending inventory is lower, as proposed. A decline in
ending inventory is irrevelant to the concept of calculating real economic
gain. In order to state cost of goods sold at current costs so as to match
current revenues, the indexed inflation adjustment should be based on
opening inventory quantities (or cost of goods sold if lower).
We also support the concept of permitting adoption of the new Indexed
FIFO method by taxpayers currently using either FIFO or LIFO. Tax
payers currently using LIFO, however, should not be required to immedi
ately recapture existing LIFO reserves when changing to Indexed FIFO. By
mandating immediate recapture, the proposal effectively prohibits tax
payers currently using LIFO from adopting Indexed FIFO, and thereby
penalizes use of a currently permitted method that otherwise implements,
to a large degree, the Administration’s stated goals and objectives. The
proposal should permit taxpayers currently using LIFO to adopt the In
dexed FIFO method with no recapture, so long as inventory quantities do
not drop below that level existing as of the date of enactment. If inventory
quantities should decline and cause a decrement, recapture should be re
quired as under current LIFO law.
We further recommend that the mechanics and procedures for use of the
Indexed FIFO method be closely analyzed to ensure simplicity. The cur
rent LIFO regulations regarding the use of the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) and the Producer Price Indexes (PPI) present complex computa
tional and conceptual problems that, in most cases, have made simplified
LIFO impractical for most taxpayers for whom it was intended.
We support the proposal for Indexed FIFO with the modifications set
forth above.
7.05—Retain $5,000 Limit on Expensing Depreciable
Business Property
The limit on expensing of depreciable property is a desirable tax benefit
conducive to both simplification and the growth of small business. Because
of these considerations, the limitation should be increased to $10,000 as
originally enacted.
7.07—Deny Rate Reduction Benefit Attributable to Ex
cess Depreciation
The intent of this provision is to eliminate the perceived windfall that
would result to a corporate taxpayer who sold an asset when the highest
marginal rate was 33 percent, but benefited from depreciation deductions
when the highest marginal benefit rate was 46 percent. It would require
such taxpayers to restore to taxable income over three years 40 percent of
the “excess” depreciation claimed for the period January 1, 1980, through
June 30, 1986.
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The amount of the recapture tax on depreciable assets would be meas
ured by the difference in tax rates multiplied by the cumulative difference
between accelerated and economic depreciation between the time the asset
was placed in service and June 30, 1986. This tax would be assessed once
the asset passes its “crossover point.” In the case of real property, the
crossover point would not be reached until several years beyond the years
for which the proposal would subject the excess to taxation. Furthermore,
in situations where taxpayers sell depreciable property prior to the
crossover point at a gain and the gain is a capital gain, only a 2.5 percent
rate reduction benefit would have occurred (20 percent maximum rate un
der existing law less 17.5 percent rate under the Administration’s proposal).
Yet, under the proposal, the 13 percent perceived windfall resulting from
the change of tax rates would have to be paid within three years from the
date of enactment of the proposal.
The proposal provides that, for purposes of the rate-reduction recapture
rule, any excess depreciation would be reduced by any net operating losses
carried forward by the taxpayer from a year before 1986 to a taxable year
beginning after 1985. This proposal creates fictitious taxable income in
order to solve what is really a rate problem. The effects of this fictitious
income inclusion could be far-reaching, and the net operating loss car
ryover provision addresses only one of the problems. In the context of the
foreign tax credit limitation for example, it is clear that the fictitious income
will distort the ratio. Furthermore, why shouldn’t the same provision apply
to net operating loss carrybacks?
The analysis indicates that the proposal contains a number of simplifying
assumptions. Earnings and profits depreciation is used as a proxy for eco
nomic depreciation. It is indicated that this choice is made primarily for
convenience, and that most of the taxpayers subject to the proposal would
be corporations that are currently required to compute earnings and profits
depreciation. In fact, corporations paying dividends that are clearly taxable
do not currently bother to calculate earnings and profits. Their provision
for deferred tax focuses on differences between financial statement de
preciation and tax ACRS. This aspect will create a substantial admin
istrative burden for taxpayers.
For these reasons, we oppose this proposal.
CHAPTER 8. MEASURE INCOME PROPERLY
8.01—Revise Accounting Rules for Production Costs
We support the concept of uniform capitalization rules. Uniformity has
several advantages, including simplicity and fairness. However, we oppose
uniform capitalization rules that result from identifying additional costs to
capitalize merely for the purpose of raising additional revenue.
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Implementing the current proposal would be an endorsement of an in
ventory costing procedure that is not currently in use by any taxpayer. Pres
ently, inventory costing procedures for tax and financial statements are
comparable. Tax differences usually arise from reserves and write-downs
from such cost required for financial statement purposes (such as Thor type
adjustments). However, the starting point currently is the cost of each in
ventory item determined for both tax and financial statement purposes in
substantially the identical manner. Implementation of the proposal may
require the calculation of two costs for each inventory item prior to the
determination of the need for additional adjustments to financial statement
inventory costs.
This added complexity can only result in a lack of compliance by tax
payers. It will take many years for the proposed rules to be clarified by
regulations, understood by taxpayers, and implemented into existing cost
accounting systems. We believe that this is an inappropriate result merely
for the purpose of a one-time revenue gain.
The current full absorption inventory costing procedures have been in
place since 1973. They are now fully understood and are being complied
with by virtually all taxpayers. Congress should not legislate inventory cost
accounting procedures and should permit the tax administrators to further
develop and implement the concept of uniform inventory capitalization
rules.
We oppose this proposal, although we support uniform capitalization
rules.
8.02— Recognize Gain on Pledges of Installment
Obligations
This proposal would cause recognition of all or a portion of the gain if an
installment obligation is pledged as security for a loan.
In general, we support this concept and believe that appropriate excep
tions have been provided for short-term business obligations. However,
clarification is needed in the portion of the proposal which provides that
gain on any subsequent collections of pledged obligations would be offset
against the gain previously generated upon the pledge of the obligations.
8.03— Limit Use of Cash Method of Accounting
This proposal would make accrual accounting mandatory for the computa
tion of taxable income where the taxpayer has average annual gross re
ceipts of more than $5 million, or regularly uses a method other than the
cash method to ascertain income, profit, or loss for financial statements,
reports, and the like.
The proposal states that the cash method does not reflect economic in
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come; is not in accordance with GAAP; is not justified for large taxpayers
that already use the accrual method for financial accounting purposes; and
that it produces a mismatching of income and deductions among taxpayers.
The Administration’s proposal implies that there should be a correlation
between financial statement accounting and tax accounting. For that rea
son, a brief discussion of the accounting principles underlying financial re
porting and the relationship to the Internal Revenue Code may be helpful
in improving the tax system.
Generally accepted accounting principles—or GAAP—are used to pre
pare financial statements, and have been developed by the Financial Ac
counting Standards Board and predecessor standard-setting bodies. The
purpose of GAAP is to accurately reflect the financial condition of a busi
ness at a particular point in time. For example, GAAP requires businesses
to consistently use the accrual method of accounting, because it most accu
rately “matches” revenues and expenses, and therefore most accurately re
flects the financial condition of a business. Thus, businesses that prepare
financial statements are required by GAAP to establish or increase re
serves for losses that have not yet occurred.
On the other hand, the purposes of tax accounting are quite different.
Tax accounting is a creature of legislative action, and for that reason tax
accounting principles reflect economic and tax policy concerns different
from GAAP. For example, current law recognizes that the ability to pay tax
liabilities is important, and therefore allows certain taxpayers to use the
cash method of accounting. For the same reason, it also allows dealers in
personal property to report income from sales of such property as pay
ments are received. Those accounting methods are not allowed under
GAAP. Also, although GAAP requires that equipment be depreciated
over its useful life, current law allows more generous write-offs to spur
investment in depreciable property. In addition, to ameliorate the effects
of the annual accounting period, the Internal Revenue Code allows the
carryback or carryover of net operating losses. Such a concept is not con
tained in GAAP, which adheres strictly to the annual accounting period
concept.
In other words, tax accounting principles have reflected Congress’s con
cern with various economic and tax policies that may not be relevant to the
presentation of financial statements.
Instead of focusing on financial accounting principles, we believe tradi
tional tax policy goals should be examined. For example, tax policy as it
relates to individuals has reflected a proper concern for the ability to pay
tax liabilities and has provided fairness among all taxpayers. However, the
Administration’s proposal limiting the use of the cash method of accounting
would ignore the traditional ability to pay concept.
In addition, in terms of fairness, the application of the proposal to cer
tain entities (over $5 million in gross receipts) creates inequitable results
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and discriminates against taxpayers who perform services through large
partnerships or professional corporations. Such individuals may perform
similar services for similar compensation as a sole proprietor or as a part
ner in a smaller partnership, yet they will be forced to use the accrual
method, while their smaller counterpart will continue to use the cash
method. The accrual method requirement thus hinges on the form of doing
business; that is not good tax policy.
It is illogical—and again inconsistent and without sound legislative pur
pose—to assume that the cash method would not clearly reflect income of a
larger service organization but would clearly reflect income in the case of a
smaller entity engaged in the identical business and operating in the identi
cal fashion.
The proposal fails to appreciate the critical fact that the aggregate size of
such businesses is immaterial and that the real taxpayers in personal service
businesses are the individuals. (Regarding individuals, it should be noted
that the generally accepted accounting principle to be applied for financial
statement purposes for individuals is neither cash nor accrual; rather, it is
to be based on a fair market value balance sheet determination. This high
lights the misplaced notion that the Administration’s proposal would bring
tax accounting and financial reporting in closer conformity for affected
taxpayers.)
It should also be noted that changing to an accrual method would be
difficult and expensive. Any individual who has been required to produce
an accrual basis financial statement for credit purposes can attest to the
difficulty. It would also add another potential area of controversy with the
IRS—that is, judgment calls regarding when and how much income and
expense should be accrued.
If the accrual method change is adopted, most partnership agreements
would have to be renegotiated and revised. In addition to the significant
time and expense of such an undertaking, the process would disrupt busi
ness activity and complicate business relationships among partners.
Tax proposals often require a trade-off between simplicity and equity,
but this proposal manages to work against both tax policy objectives. Un
der the Administration’s proposal, income would be taxed to certain indi
viduals before they receive it. The resulting cash flow problem could force
them to borrow or sell assets to pay their taxes.
To summarize, evaluating the tax accounting proposals from the stand
point of conformity with financial statement reporting principles is inap
propriate because the goals of the two systems are different. And, different
goals require the application of different principles.
For all of these reasons, we oppose this proposal as it relates to profes
sional service businesses. The cash method has been recognized for sev
enty-five years as a method that accurately reflects income. It is simple in
application and fair in result. It should be retained.
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8.04—Repeal Reserve Method for Bad Debt
Deductions
This proposal would repeal the reserve method of accounting for bad
debts, thereby deferring the timing of a deduction for bad debts until ac
counts receivable become wholly or partially worthless and, even then,
only if the account was also charged off in whole or in part at that time.
There are three stated reasons for the proposed change. First, the re
serve method results in a mismatching of income and expense because it
accelerates a deduction to a period earlier than when the actual loss occurs.
Second, the acceleration of the deduction raises questions about the time
value of money. Third, the availability of the reserve method for bad debts
encourages lenders to make risky loans.
The economic consequences of using the reserve method of accounting
for bad debts would appear to be somewhat different for financial institu
tions and other lenders, as opposed to the use of such a method in connec
tion with trade receivables generated by manufacturers, wholesalers, re
tailers, and service providers using accrual accounting. These trade
receivables are generally collected well within a year and our comments
will be restricted to such accounts.
Under Treasury Reg. 1.166-1(b), taxpayers are granted the right to elect
the reserve method in the first year they are entitled to a bad debt deduc
tion. Taxpayers who may have previously elected the specific charge-off
method may routinely change to the reserve method under Rev. Proc. 85-8.
Once the reserve method is established, the taxpayer may annually deduct
a reasonable addition to the reserve, which shall be determined in light of
the existing facts at the close of the taxable year. As a practical matter,
taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service have relied on a formula devel
oped in Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 300 (1940), to deter
mine the reasonable addition to the bad debt reserve. The Black Motor Co.
formula is a six-year moving average that utilizes the ratio of the actual
accounts charged off during the six-year period to the accounts receivable
outstanding at the end of each of the six years. Used for over forty years,
this formula is utilized in Rev. Proc. 85-8 and was endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
Many taxpayers with short-term trade receivables, particularly those
with a high volume of small dollar transactions, have developed very accu
rate historical data showing the relationship of charge-offs to both sales and
total outstanding accounts receivable. By using statistical techniques, these
taxpayers can accurately determine the portion of any outstanding accounts
receivable that will be written off in the future.
To the extent that a taxpayer can statistically demonstrate that a given
percentage of its sales in a given year (to the extent uncollected at yearend) will never be collected, we believe that a mismatch occurs if the bad
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debt expense is not recorded in the year that the revenue from the sale was
recorded. Even though the exact accounts to be written off in the future
cannot be identified at the point of sale, income in the year of sale is still
overstated if the sales are recorded at 100 percent because it can be demon
strated that some of the sales will never be collected, even though the un
collectible accounts cannot be specifically identified at that time.
The Administration’s concern about the time value of money seems par
ticularly misplaced in the context of the Black Motor Co. formula, which,
as stated earlier, generally results in a reserve equal to those accounts that
will actually be written off within the next twelve months. If the account
were not identified and charged off until four or five years in the future, the
concern with time value might have some validity. However, to date, the
time value of money concept, which figured prominently in the Deficit Re
duction Act of 1984, has not focused on situations where the time span
between accrual and economic performance, payment, identification of
loss, and so on is for a period of only twelve months or less.
The Administration also argues that the reserve method discriminates in
favor of firms with growing accounts receivable or worsening loss experi
ence. Regarding the growth in receivables, unless the prior bad debt his
tory is no longer relevant, it seems perfectly logical that a taxpayer with
increasing accounts receivable would have a larger bad debt reserve than
one with a smaller accounts receivable base. In the case of worsening loss
experience, it also seems perfectly logical that such a taxpayer should have
a larger reserve for bad debts than one with more favorable bad debt
experience.
In this same context, it is agreed that the reserve method may treat tax
payers differently, but the result would be no different under the specific
proposed charge-off method. Under the specific charge-off method, a de
duction could be taken in the year that the taxpayer determines the account
to be worthless and actually writes it off. In the first place, this method
would generate many more controversies between taxpayers and revenue
agents than the relatively mechanical application of the Black Motor Co.
formula. Secondly, taxpayers have widely divergent practices about how
rapidly they proceed against delinquent accounts receivable and ultimately
write them off. Given this widely divergent credit and collection practice,
the specific charge-off method will result in vastly differing deductions for
otherwise similarly situated taxpayers.
The last argument put forth by the Administration is that the use of the
reserve method encourages lenders to make risky loans. No evidence exists
to support this proposition. It is, however, well acknowledged in the busi
ness world that a business with extremely tight credit policies would gener
ally have a lower sales volume than a business with somewhat more relaxed
credit policies. Obviously, a business with overly relaxed credit policies
could have significantly expanded sales volume at the expense of very high
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accounts receivable, extensive collection costs, and high bad debt chargeoffs. The goal of any successful business is to find the proper relationship
between tight credit and expanded sales volume.
The Administration has not raised any arguments about administrative
convenience or simplicity in the bad debt proposal. In fact, we believe that
the specific charge-off method would be more complex and would generate
more controversies between the IRS and taxpayers. The Administration
also has not indicated that there is any present abuse in the reserve method
of accounting for bad debts.
For the reasons stated, we oppose this proposal and urge the retention of
the reserve method of accounting for bad debts.
8.05—Repeal Mining and Solid Waste Reclamation and
Closing Cost Deduction
This proposal would eliminate the deduction currently allowed to accrual
basis taxpayers for the estimated future reclamation or closing costs attrib
utable to production or mining activities in the current year. The reason
given for the proposed change is that economic performance will occur, and
the related costs will be paid, in the future. Furthermore, it is noted that
the current system is substantially more complicated than simply deducting
the future expenses as they occur.
The proposed position is inconsistent with the concept that costs should
be matched with related income in multi-period production operations.
The reclamation and closing costs in some operations may amount to a
significant part of the cost of production. If so, eliminating the effect of
these costs from the calculation of the cost of the product could have a
serious and adverse financial effect on the operation, which will not be
solved by the ultimate allowable deduction and resulting net operating loss
carryback. Instead of creating a setting in which economic decisions can be
made against a “tax neutral” background, the focused mismatching of tax
able receipts and deductions may well cause low margin but profitable oper
ations to become economically unprofitable because of the tax
consequences.
For these reasons, we oppose this proposal.
CHAPTER 9. REVISE TAXATION OF ENERG Y
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
9.02—Repeal Percentage Depletion
Since the establishment of the income tax in this country, percentage deple
tion has been recognized as a method of capital recovery for the extractive
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industries. The capital of these industries is represented largely by mineral
reserves that are discovered, developed, and produced. These reserves are
discovered by exploration efforts rather than being created or constructed,
as in the case of other types of assets. Such mineral reserves represent the
product sold, not assets used to produce products to be sold. Thus, they are
frequently called wasting assets.
From the beginning, at least a part of the income of the taxpayers pro
ducing natural resources was recognized as the return of capital value exist
ing on March 1, 1913. Accordingly, the Revenue Act of 1913 allowed 5
percent of gross income as a depletion deduction. However, it was felt that
the 5 percent deduction did not fully accomplish a return of the initial cap
ital value, so Congress next allowed depletion based on the recovery of cost
or the March 1, 1913, value.
This system not only created problems of valuation of existing proper
ties, but also discriminated against newly discovered properties by limiting
depletion to initial cost. Recognizing that cost has little relationship to the
value of a mineral property, the Revenue Act of 1918 added the allowance
of discovery depletion, based on the fair market value of properties at the
date of discovery.
Although in theory the concept of discovery depletion allowed fair recov
ery of capital based on value, it produced difficult questions of practicality.
As a result, percentage depletion was substituted for discovery depletion
for oil and gas wells in the Revenue Act of 1926, and for metal mines in
1932. The percentages allotted to various minerals and metals were deter
mined by compiling statistics of recorded discovery valuation cases com
pared to production.
The history of percentage depletion is based, in part, on the desire for
simplicity. To allow a method of capital recovery based on a percentage of
gross income (where the percentage was in turn based on industry histo
ries) is simpler than a depletion computation based on annual production
and estimates of recoverable reserves.
In answer to the question of whether it is fair to provide for such recov
ery of capital on a “favored” or “preferential” basis, it is suggested that this
treatment is required in order to treat extractive industries comparably
with other industries. All capital recovery has long been given a favored
status in our tax system by allowing a deduction for cost and by the applica
tion of capital gains tax rates. If capital recovery in non-extractive areas is
accorded this favored status, then equally favorable taxation of capital re
covery (using the older system of discovery depletion, or the more sim
plified system of percentage depletion) is required to provide equity among
the extractive industries and various other industries.
The proposal would permit continuation of percentage depletion of
“stripper wells ” Since these wells constitute about 15 percent of domestic
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oil production and are produced typically on a very limited margin of prof
itability, percentage depletion would be continued in the interest of na
tional security and maintaining energy independence. The rationale behind
allowing percentage depletion as a subsidy for stripper wells is strained by
the fact that the 50 percent limitation acts to reduce or eliminate the deduc
tion in the case of the wells for which it would be most needed; that is, the
wells on which the profit level had declined to near or below zero. If it is
desirable to subsidize such production, then a method should be utilized
that would give increased support with decreased profits, and not vice
versa.
For these reasons, we oppose this proposal.

9.03—Revise Minimum Tax on Intangible Drilling
Costs
The proposal provides that 8 percent of all intangible drilling costs (IDCs)
paid or incurred on successful wells in a taxable year would constitute a tax
preference item. The amount of IDCs treated as preference items would
not be reduced by net income from oil and gas properties as under present
law. The amount of 8 percent is proposed as representing the difference
between the present value of expensing and the present value of the deduc
tions that would be allowed if the taxpayer capitalized the IDCs and de
preciated them as CCRS class 3 property. It should be noted, however, that
as the tax rate is reduced, the difference between the present value of ex
pensing and capitalizing grows smaller, but the amount of IDCs treated as a
preference item is not reduced accordingly. We support the proposal.
Additional Comments. The proposal would allow optional treatment to be
continued, although the Treasury’s original proposal would have eliminated
the deduction option. Because of the deduction’s controversial nature, it is
presumed that the question of its elimination may be raised once more, and
our comments are therefore included on this issue.
The option to deduct IDCs was first provided by T.D. 2447 in 1917.
Although variations have been made in the rules as they were reissued in
1919, 1943, 1956, 1960, 1965, and so on, IDCs have continued to be elec
tively allowed as a deduction ever since.
The IDC incurred in the exploration and development of oil and gas
wells has historically been allowed as an elective expense, even though it
was capital in nature.
To achieve equity in taxation among industries, differences between in
dustries must be fully understood and recognized.
In the case of a manufacturing plant, a building is typically constructed
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or purchased, and production machinery acquired and installed. Although
the taxpayer may on occasion pay more or less than fair market value for
the assets involved, a direct relationship usually exists between the cost and
the value of the assets. Good accounting practices as well as tax law, require
that such costs be capitalized and deducted ratably against the income
earned from the future use of the property in the manufacturing process.
In the case of the extractive industries, however, drilling and develop
ment costs do not represent either the purchase or the construction of a
valuable asset. They represent instead either a complete loss (that is, dry
hole) or the discovery of oil, gas, or other mineral reserves that have always
existed but only now been found. There is no typical relationship between
drilling costs and the value of reserves discovered. A well may discover
reserves worth many times the drilling costs, or a well may be drilled at
great cost that may discover no reserves at all. It is important to keep in
mind this difference between the act of constructing or purchasing an asset
and the act of discovering one.
Drilling costs are not like expenditures for the acquisition of assets such
as buildings and machinery. They more nearly resemble research and de
velopment expenditures. Both research and development, as well as drill
ing costs, are undertaken with an expectation of profit, but with no assured
magnitude of the value to be discovered. Either type of expenditure can,
and sometimes will, result in great profit. Either type can, and frequently
will, result in large economic loss. It should be noted that neither the Ad
ministration’s proposal nor the original Treasury proposal recommend cap
italization of research and development costs.
Since the value of buildings and machinery may be reasonably deter
mined prior to acquisition, the cost of acquisition may be financed by
pledging the assets to a lender. On the other hand, unproven oil and gas
reserves (suspected deposits in areas not yet proven by drilling) are sel
dom, if ever, allowed as collateral for a loan. While ideas to be researched
or the possibility of finding unproven oil and gas reserves may attract inves
tors with equity capital, neither will normally serve as collateral for debt
financing.
9.04—Revise Royalty Taxation
The provisions establishing long-term capital gain treatment for timber,
coal, and iron ore royalty income would be repealed under this proposal,
along with the provisions for elective sale or exchange treatment for owners
of timber or timber contracts. Problems of recovery of capital, the histor
ical tax-favored status of capital recovery, and questions of fairness between
industries are discussed in section 9.02 above and are not repeated here.
We oppose this proposal.
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CHAPTER 10. REFORM TAXATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
10.01—Repeal Special Rules for Depository Institution
Bad Debt Deductions
We support the modification of the special rules for depository institutions’
bad debt deductions. Since the percentage method for bad debt deductions
for commercial banks will be phased out in 1987, its elimination would
result in greater simplicity and fairness without causing undue harm to the
industry. However, rather than outright repeal of the reserve method, fi
nancial institutions should be allowed to use the experience method of
computing the addition to the bad debt reserve.
10.02—Deny Deduction for Interest to Carry
Tax-Exempt Bonds
This proposal does not result in a simplification of the current tax law. From
an economic viewpoint, it is potentially harmful in these respects:
Since financial institutions are primary owners of tax-exempt bonds, this
proposal would probably decrease the value of these bonds so severely that
a number of marginal institutions would have problems meeting their reg
ulatory capital requirements.
To eliminate the potentially harmful devaluation of existing tax-exempt
portfolios, we recommend modification of the proposal to cover tax-ex
empt securities issued on or after January 1, 1986, rather than securities
purchased on or after January 1, 1986.

10.03—Repeal Tax Exemption for Large Credit Unions
Although this proposal would not result in simplification, it would never
theless place large credit unions on par with other financial institutions.
Therefore, we support the proposal.

10.04—Repeal Reorganization Rules for Financially
Troubled Thrifts
For reasons of fairness and simplicity, we support the proposal to repeal the
special reorganization rules for financially troubled thrifts. This will elimi
nate the disparity in treatment between troubled thrifts and other finan
cially troubled organizations.
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10.05—Repeal Special Rules for Net Operating Losses
of Depository Institutions
Originally, the carryback rules for financial institutions were liberalized to
allow them to take full tax advantage of the percentage method of adding to
their bad debt reserves. Now that the percentage method, as a practical
matter, has been phased out of existence, the current ten-year carryback of
net operating losses is no longer needed. Further, over time there will be
added simplicity, particularly where consolidated returns are concerned.
For these reasons we support the proposal.
CHAPTER 12. MODIFY OTHER SPECIFIC
SUBSIDIES
12.01—Repeal Tax Credit for Qualified Rehabilitation
Withdrawing the credit would accomplish the objective of a more neutral
tax system, but would override the original objectives in enacting the
credit.
We oppose this proposal.

CHAPTER 13. CURTAIL TAX SHELTERS
13.02—Extend At-Risk Limitation to Real Estate
This proposal would restrict the use of tax losses from limited-risk real
estate transactions by individual taxpayers to offset current taxable income
received from other sources. Curtailment of this tax shelter activity would
result in greater equity and an improved perception of the income tax sys
tem by the American public.
We support this proposal.
13.03—Revise Alternative Minimum Tax for
Noncorporate Taxpayers
This proposal would revise the alternative minimum tax for noncorporate
taxpayers. Although we agree with the policy objectives of an individual
minimum tax, this particular proposal unnecessarily complicates the com
putation of the preference items. The tightening of the alternative mini
mum tax (AMT) under this proposal would also increase the number of
taxpayers subject to AMT. Affected taxpayers would be required to apply
two different sets of rules to the same items of income and expense. While
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some additional complexity for the sake of greater equity is acceptable, this
proposal creates significant complexity, and the price is too great. Never
theless, if an AMT is pursued, rules for broad uniform concepts should be
developed.
We agree with the policy objectives of a minimum tax; however, we op
pose this proposal.
13.04—Revise Corporate Minimum Tax
As stated in our comments on section 13.03, we support the concept of a
minimum tax. However, we oppose this proposal, as the proposed revisions
do not simplify the tax rules.
CHAPTER 14. REVISE TREATMENT OF
RETIREM ENT SAVINGS
14.01—Increase Spousal Individual Retirement Account
Limits
The Administration proposes to increase the limit on Individual Retire
ment Accounts (IRAs) for nonworking spouses to $2,000. The reason for
the proposal is to encourage and broaden the use of IRAs to provide retire
ment security. The inequities to families with a nonworking spouse are also
cited as discriminatory and unfair.
We support this proposal. The elimination of the inequities to a non
working spouse is cited as a desirable goal, and we agree in this case. Ineq
uities sometimes exist in tax law and should remain so to accomplish other
benefits that outweigh the disadvantage of inequity. However, more study
should be given to the proposal’s impact on revenues. When IRAs were
first made available to all working employees, regardless of coverage under
employer qualified plans, revenue impact studies were grossly understated.
14.02— Unify Rules for Distribution from Tax-Favored
Retirement Plans
The Administration proposes to reduce the complexity and inconsistency in
distributions from qualified retirement plans by uniform treatment of dis
tributions. Changes are also proposed to discourage early withdrawal and
to extend withdrawal over the individual’s retirement years.
We agree that uniformity in distribution rules is a desirable goal. We
endorse the elimination of disqualification as a sanction for violation of
distribution rules by qualified employer plans. Both of these proposals will
simplify the complicated rules of distributions.
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The special tax treatment given to certain qualified “lump-sum distribu
tions” (LSDs) deserves considerable study before it is eliminated. One of
the reasons for the enactment of special tax treatment for LSDs was to
reduce the tax impact of “bunching of income” that had accrued over many
years. Many individuals will continue to receive distributions in a single
year because of circumstances beyond their control. By doing so, the dis
tribution will be taxed at a much higher rate than if the distribution were
received over several years. The elimination of this unfair bunching of in
come is the very purpose of the special tax treatment.
The Administration should also consider the impact on revenues of the
elimination of this special tax treatment. Revenues received with the spe
cial treatment may actually be higher, when compared to the present value
of future tax on distributions over a number of years at lower tax brackets.
The benefits of easing the tax burden on LSDs outweigh the disadvantage
of complexity and should be retained. The capital gain element is already
being gradually eliminated since only distributions attributable to contribu
tions before 1974 qualify for capital gain tax treatment.
When the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
was enacted, capital gain taxation was eliminated for all years after 1973, a
date selected to prevent retroactive elimination of capital gain treatment.
The Administration now proposes to ignore ERISA in its elimination of
capital gains taxation, a clear conflict with the original policy of grand
fathering contributions prior to 1974.
A minimum distribution penalty of 50 percent of the difference between
the required minimum distribution and the amount actually distributed
would be imposed on the recipient with a right, in some cases, to recover
the penalty from the plan. A minimum distribution is based on the life
expectancy of the participant or beneficiary. Although the proposal would
simplify life expectancy calculations by using standard five-year ranges to
determine the minimum distribution, in many cases complicated actuarial
computations may still be required with regard to recapture tax on early
distributions. Tax simplification will not be achieved if the recipient is sub
ject to such a penalty. Since the computations must be made at the plan
level, if indeed such a penalty is necessary, it should be imposed on the plan
administrator. Possibly, the administrator should have the right to recover
from the recipient if the latter has submitted incorrect information about
age, etc. Furthermore, a 50 percent nondeductible penalty on the under
distribution is extremely harsh and is comparable to the existing fraud
penalty. Also, any penalty should be abated if due to reasonable cause.
The Administration proposes to change the basis recovery rules in con
nection with plan distributions. Distributions prior to the so-called annuity
starting date would be treated first as income, rather than recovery of em
ployee nondeductible contributions. There would be a transitional rule so
that pre-January 1, 1986, employee contributions would be recovered first,
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then distributions would be income and, finally, they would consist of
post-1985 employee contributions. This proposal adds more complexity
rather than simplicity.
Since nondeductible employee contributions are restricted with regards
to amount and also affect maximum annual additions to a defined contribu
tion plan, their one advantage—that they are recovered tax-free before any
income is triggered—should be retained. The overall desire to increase
savings to improve our economy would best be served if the current recov
ery rule with respect to voluntary contributions is continued. Furthermore,
it is simpler to deal with recoveries before income, and it avoids a tremen
dous amount of recordkeeping.
To avoid this harsh result, a participant with a substantial amount of
voluntary contributions to a plan could opt for a lump-sum distribution. He
or she would then rollover the amount in excess of the cost basis into an.
IRA. Effectively, the entire cost would be recovered tax-free and the IRA
distributions need not start until age seventy and one-half.
Another proposal is the elimination of the three-year annuity rule. This
rule has worked well for many years. Most qualified plan distributions in
clude relatively small contributions by the employee-participants, as com
pared to the cost element of a commercial annuity. Recovering the em
ployee’s contributions over a period of up to three years is a very simple
way to account for the taxation of the benefits. After recovery, all distribu
tions are fully taxable to the participant and his or her beneficiaries. Fur
thermore, delaying taxation of benefits in the years immediately following
retirement can have a very beneficial effect since there is such a tremen
dous change in the employee’s economic status.
A further proposal is to change the annuity rule, whereby the partici
pant’s cost (that is, voluntary contributions) will be recovered over his or
her life expectancy. Upon the participant’s death, any unrecovered cost will
be deducted by the beneficiaries. If the participant outlives his life expec
tancy, the cost recovery will cease and future distributions will be fully
taxable. This is unbelievably complex and will require tremendous rec
ordkeeping. In most cases, the cost basis to the participant will be insignifi
cant in relationship to the amount of paperwork involved. For these rea
sons, we oppose this aspect of the proposed changes in the annuity rules.
14.03—Modify Deduction Rules for Tax-Favored
Retirement Plans
The Administration proposes to replace the present 15 percent of aggregate
compensation limit for profit-sharing plans, with a requirement that contri
butions for any individual cannot exceed 15 percent of such individual’s
compensation for the year. The carryover of unused contribution limits of
25 percent of aggregate compensation would be eliminated unless the plan
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is a “retirement type” plan. The present combined limit on contributions to
profit-sharing plans and pension plans of 25 percent would be extended to a
combination defined contribution pension plan and defined benefit pension
plan. Excess contributions would no longer trigger disqualification, but
would be subject to a 10 percent tax annually as long as the excess contribu
tion remained in the plan and was nondeductible. Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) would be placed in parity with other qualified
plans eliminating the special tax treatment of ESOPs.
Small employers select profit-sharing plans because of the flexibility they
afford in contributions. If the employer’s earnings are volatile, a discretion
ary profit-sharing plan allows him to have a retirement plan without fear of
incurring ill-timed required contributions. The credit carryovers also allow
the employer to make up contributions to employees for years that no con
tributions or less than the allowable contributions were made. In this way,
the small employer or the employer in an industry with volatile earnings
can provide its employees with a retirement plan. Elimination of the in
creased limit carryover will only diminish the ability of the employer to
provide reasonable contributions to employee retirement plans. This pro
posal provides little, if any, simplification of the tax code. Small employers
generally fall into the top-heavy category under which the proposal would
prohibit carryover provisions for such plans.
The reason for the larger contribution limitations on combined defined
contribution pension plans and defined benefit plans under present law is
that minimum-funding standards require contributions to a defined contri
bution pension plan regardless of the deductibility. If combination defined
contribution pension plan deduction limits are to be imposed (in the same
amounts as combination profit-sharing deduction limits), then minimum
funding rules should be changed to require contributions only to the extent
of deductible amounts. This will prevent plan sponsors from having to
make contributions to a money purchase pension plan for which no deduc
tion is allowable. Further consideration is warranted in light of the mini
mum-funding standards imposed by ERISA. ERISA attempted to assure
employees that funds would be set aside as promised by employers and
therefore imposed minimum-funding standards. We again encourage fur
ther study into the reasons for the existing law before major departures are
made.
A serious problem with the complexity of tax law is the constant chang
ing of certain provisions. A case in point is the proposal to eliminate all
special provisions relating to ESOPs and thus place them in parity with
other qualified plans. In the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (TRA ’84), enacted in
July 1984, certain changes were made to ESOP rules to encourage expan
sion of ESOP use. Just a year ago ESOPs were viewed as good for the
economy and employee ownership was encouraged. Now, it seems that all
of that reasoning was incorrect and all the provisions encouraging ESOPs
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should be taken out of the law. This contradiction indicates a need to give
proper consideration and study to ESOP tax law changes before they are
enacted. Certainly, a consideration of reasons for TRA ’84 ESOP provi
sions is warranted.
We oppose this proposal. We feel that a better approach to simplification
of qualified retirement plan law is to take the necessary time to study all
provisions relating to this area. Various limitation provisions should be co
ordinated in a cohesive manner, giving due consideration to combining lim
itations into a single acceptable set of rules. Simplification of qualified plan
rules is desirable and attainable, if proper study and deliberation are given.
We would welcome the opportunity to work with various interested parties
on such a project and assist in the simplification effort.
14.04—Modifying Annual Limits on Contributions and
Benefits Under Tax-Favored Plans
This proposal may be summarized as taking two general approaches. First,
it intimates that smaller employers are suspect and larger employers are
not; the same attitude found in the top-heavy rules. Second, it presumes
fairness and simplicity can be achieved by shifting the monitoring of max
imum annual additions and benefits to qualified plans from the plan admin
istrator to the retired participant.
Elimination of the annual addition and benefit limit for a participant in
both a defined contribution and a defined benefit plan, except top-heavy
plans, is discriminatory in applying the law. The principal reason given for
the change is the complexity of determining the limitations. Clearly, a
larger non-top-heavy plan would more likely have the professional help to
accomplish this than the smaller top-heavy plan.
By instituting a 10 percent penalty tax for annual benefit distributions
received by a participant or beneficiary in excess of 125 percent of the
defined benefit annual limit (currently $90,000 x 125 percent = $112,500),
more complexity rather than less would result. The stated purpose for this
change (other than reducing complexity at the plan administrator level
where it could more easily be handled) is to penalize those individuals who
were able to benefit from plans of more than one employer. It is doubtful
that the number of individuals with duplicate coverage necessitates this
change; the cure may be worse than the disease.
The 10 percent penalty tax would actually penalize participants of de
fined contribution plans for achieving good investment results. In fact, not
even a very great investment return may be necessary to have a participant/
beneficiary fall into this penalty situation. For example, if a participant
received annual additions to a defined contribution plan of $25,000 for
twenty years and the plan had an average investment yield of only 8 per
cent, the participant’s account would reach approximately $1,144,000 at the
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end of the twenty-year period. Equal payments over the succeeding twenty
years with a yield of 8 percent, would produce annual distributions of about
$116,500 and a 10 percent penalty on $4,000. If the same participant also
had contributed to an IRA, all of the benefits from the IRA would be
penalized at 10 percent.
We oppose this proposal.
14.05—Apply 10 Percent Recapture Tax to Qualified
Retirement Plan Assets Reverting to Employer
The Administration proposes to impose an additional tax of 10 percent of
qualified retirement plan funds reverting to the employer upon plan
termination.
We agree in principle that such abuses as those described in the proposal
should be effectively controlled. However, many plan terminations are
made as a matter of last resort when the employer is experiencing financial
difficulty. If the plan has been overfunded and no intended abuse is pres
ent, the employer should not be penalized. We believe other restrictions
can be applied to prevent abuses by reducing overfunding inherent in cer
tain actuarial assumptions, and by limiting the penalty to abuse cases. We
support this proposal if modifications are added to exclude cases where
abuse is not intentional.

14.06—Revise Cash or Deferred Arrangement (Section
401(k)) and Employer Matching Contribution
Rules
The Administration’s proposal would make substantial changes to cash or
deferred arrangements (CODAs), adding several new restrictions, limits,
and requirements. Among the many changes is a new limit of $8,000 max
imum deferral per participant, reductions to the limit for IRA contribu
tions, establishment of separate limits for plans meeting special re
strictions, and new rules relating to employer matching contributions.
The $8,000 maximum deferral limit is imposed in addition to the preex
isting section 415 limitation of $30,000 for qualified plans. This second limit
is unduly restrictive and will result in employers establishing additional or
alternative retirement plans to avoid the limit, creating unnecessary costs
and administrative burdens. The further reduction in the limit for IRA
contributions also is objectionable for similar reasons.
The provision to disqualify a CODA when excess contributions are not
distributed by the end of the year, following the year in which the excess
occurred, is unduly harsh. When the excess is not discovered in time to
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make the correction, a disqualification will harm all participants in the
plan. A penalty would be more appropriate.
We oppose this proposal.
14.07—Modify Rules for Benefit Forfeitures
Under the proposal, qualified pension plans would be permitted to use
forfeitures of benefits to increase benefits for other employees covered un
der the plan. Uniform treatment for all qualified plans is desired and the
proposal would benefit rank-and-file employees.
We agree with the proposal because it will simplify the administration of
pension plans.
CHAPTER 15. REFORM INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION
Introduction
The main consequence of proposals affecting the international area is to
increase the U.S. tax burden on international operations of U.S. multina
tional corporations, relative to the tax burden on domestic operations. The
proposals anticipate an increase in domestic production because of reduced
tax benefits from operating abroad. The proposals do not consider whether
the anticipated increase in domestic production and consequent increases
in tax collections may not materialize because nontax factors will make it
preferable to operate abroad or because the business would be taken over
by foreign competition whose tax burden is less than that of the U.S.
multinational.
15.01—Reform Foreign Tax Credit
Under this proposal, the credit for taxes imposed by any foreign country
would be limited to the U.S. tax on income from that country. Losses in a
given foreign country would be prorated between U.S. source income and
income from sources in other countries, and subsequent profits in the loss
country would be allocated to taxable income elsewhere in the same man
ner as the losses were allocated (Recoupment Principle). To preserve the
integrity of the per-country limitation, dividends and subpart F income
from foreign subsidiaries earning income in more than one foreign country
would be resourced to the countries in which the income was earned in
proportion to the subsidiary’s after-tax income (including dividends from
each country). Where the country of incorporation taxes income from
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sources in other countries, an election can be made to consider a portion of
the home country’s taxes as taxes imposed by the country in which the
income is earned. A separate tracing and allocation of income sources
would be required for separate limitation investment income. We also un
derstand that the tracing and allocation rules would apply to fourth and
lower tier subsidiaries, even though no foreign tax credit is allowed for
lower than third-tier taxes.
This proposal is primarily based on the premise that the overall limita
tion diverts investment from the United States to other countries with
lower tax rates. This premise would be true if investment decisions by the
business sector were based primarily on comparative tax rates. In fact, in
vestment decisions in the business world are a product of multiple factors.
In addition to taxes, a business would consider labor costs, availability of
raw materials and components, access to markets (including customs duties
and import quotas), import and export restrictions generally, local nontax
investment incentives such as availability of low-cost local financing, and
general economic and political stability.
Two of the major objectives for repealing the per-country limitation in
1976 (at the time the limitation was the greater of the per-country or overall
limitation) were to prevent the allowance of foreign tax credits where losses
in some countries reduced or eliminated overall foreign source income, and
simplification of the foreign tax credit calculation.
The first objective would be retained to the extent losses in a foreign
country are allocated to taxable income in other foreign countries. The
Recoupment Principle for subsequent profits in loss countries may or may
not be beneficial, depending upon the availability of tax loss carryover in
foreign countries, and the generation of subsequent profits in loss coun
tries. This proposal raises a question of equity and fairness by giving tax
payers the worst result where the detriment from allocation of losses is not
offset by application of the Recoupment Principle.
The second objective would be lost. Taxpayers would have to calculate a
separate foreign tax credit limitation for each country in which their in
come is sourced. Regarding dividends from foreign subsidiaries, tracing
could go through multiple tiers of corporations, and it would be necessary
to calculate the effect of resourcing foreign taxes to determine whether the
elective resourcing treatment is advantageous. Elaborate bookkeeping,
particularly with respect to application of the Recoupment Principle, will
unnecessarily complicate an already complex area of the code.
Given restrictions on allowance of the foreign tax credit enacted in 1976,
adoption of Regs. §1.861-8 for allocating and apportioning deductions in
1977, and rules enacted in 1984 to provide for the tracing of U.S. source
and separate limitation interest income, we question whether the addi
tional revenue that may result from enactment of the proposal would be
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worth the additional time and effort that would be required on the part of
taxpayers and the IRS to administer the proposed revisions.
In the event the per-country limitation is adopted, we recommend the
following modifications be adopted:
1. The credit should be determined on a strict per-country basis and the
proposals for allocation of losses and the Recoupment Principle
should be dropped. Any marginal increase in fairness resulting from
allocating losses under the proposal will be more than offset by the
increased complexity resulting from necessity for accurate records in
tracing losses for subsequent application of the Recoupment
Principle.
2. The proposal would require sourcing of separate limitation invest
ment income on a per-country basis. Given the new restrictions on the
foreign tax credit limitation for investment income contained in the
1984 Tax Act, the expansion of the definition of separate limitation
investment income in the proposal, and the fact that it is usually quite
easy to avoid any taxes on portfolio investment income, any require
ments for determining the foreign tax credit limitation for such in
come on a per-country basis should be eliminated.

15.02—Modify Sourcing Rules for Income and
Deductions
Carryforward and Election Rules

Under the proposal, the existing two-year carryback of excess foreign tax
credits would be retained and the carryforward period for excess credit
would be extended from five to ten years. Taxpayers would be permitted to
credit or deduct foreign taxes on a per-country basis instead of the present
all-or-nothing election.
We endorse these proposals, subject to the following recommendations,
which would increase fairness in application of the foreign tax credit:
1. In the interest of consistency, the carryover period should be three
years back and fifteen years forward as in the case of other business
credits.
2. Taxpayers should be allowed to deduct all excess foreign tax credits.
This is critical for U.S. contractors and other service providers who
are subject to foreign taxes on work performed in the United States
and for customers and clients located in foreign countries that base
their taxes on the place where the benefit of the services is received
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rather than where the work is performed, which is the U.S. rule.
Implementation of this recommendation would preserve or increase
employment in the United States.
Research and Development Expenses

The current moratorium on apportionment of U.S. research and develop
ment (R&D) expenses to foreign source income for purposes of the foreign
tax credit limitation is due to expire after 1985. Although the proposal
recommends extending the R&D credit (which is also due to expire after
1985) for three more years, there is no mention of whether the R&D mor
atorium for foreign tax credits will be continued.
Apportionment of R&D expenses to foreign source income has been
justified on the basis that R&D generally contributes to the profitability of
foreign operations. However, to the extent apportioned R&D generates
excess foreign tax credits, the result is the same as though there was no
deduction for R&D and the credit was allowed. Since R&D is usually a
more discretionary expenditure than foreign taxes, the effect is to provide a
disincentive for R&D expenditures for corporations with excess foreign tax
credits.
We recommend that the moratorium be made permanent, or at least
extended for whatever additional period the R&D credit is extended.
Sourcing of Royalties

This provision would maintain the existing rule that royalties from related
foreign licensees will continue to generate foreign source income and pro
poses to maintain the generally accepted rule that sales of intangibles for
use abroad generate foreign source income.
Unlike passive investment income such as portfolio interest and divi
dends, intangible property licenses are usually motivated by nontax consid
erations and are usually much closer to ordinary business operations.
For the same reasons that support the provisions for sourcing royalties
from related persons, we recommend that royalties from unrelated li
censes, for use of intangibles abroad, should continue to generate foreign
source income.
Sourcing of Income

Property Sales. This provision would replace the present title passage test,
for determining the source of sales income, with sourcing the income in the
seller’s country of residence unless a fixed place of business in another
country materially participates in the sale. In the latter case, the income
would be sourced in that country. In the case of goods manufactured in one
country and sold in another, the income would be sourced in the country in
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which the goods are manufactured unless the manufacturer has a fixed
place of business for selling the goods in another country, in which case 50
percent of the income would be considered to be sourced in each country as
under present regulations.
Contrary to an implicit objective of the international proposals to en
courage employment in the United States, this proposal would have the
effect of discouraging exports by increasing U.S. taxes on exports in many
situations, thereby reducing chances of successful competition with foreign
suppliers. An additional response to changing the source rules could be to
move U.S. manufacturing operations abroad so that the entire profit would
generate foreign source income.
In addition, basing the sourcing rules on a subjective test like the pre
dominant location of selling activities, rather than on an objective test such
as the place title passes will increase uncertainty and disputes in the already
murky international tax area.
80/20 Corporation Rules for Interest and Dividends. This provision would
treat dividends and interest paid by U.S. corporations that normally derive
at least 80 percent of their gross income from foreign sources as U.S.
source rather than foreign source income, as under present law. The pro
posal does not identify any particular problem with the current rule except
for semantic restructuring that would classify interest income, which is not
subject to withholding under current law because it is considered to be
from foreign sources (for example, bank account interest), as simply ex
empt from withholding. This takes a diametrically opposite approach from
the proposal concerning the per-country limitation for the foreign tax
credit. This proposal would look solely to the country of incorporation
rather than the sources of income to determine sources of interest and
dividends paid by the corporation.
The chief impact of the proposal would appear to be on foreign persons’
wishing to invest in countries where the home country does not have a tax
treaty with the third country, but the United States does have a treaty with
that country. It would appear to be better to deal with this problem through
the antitreaty Model Treaty. For U.S. shareholders, the chief impact re
lates to expense allocations for foreign tax credits. With enactment of re
quirements for tracing investment interest in 1984, the only significant ben
efit that remains appears to be where a U.S. shareholder prefers to conduct
foreign operations through a branch of a U.S. corporation rather than
through a foreign corporation. As a matter of fact, it appears that U.S.
shareholders could reap significant benefits in some situations under the
proposal where expenses and losses with respect to assets yielding foreign
source income are required to be allocated and apportioned to foreign
source income in computing the foreign tax credit limitation.
Since the chief remaining value of the 80/20 exception is to facilitate
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investments abroad by U.S. and foreign investors through U.S. rather than
foreign corporations, we recommend retention of the existing 80/20 rules
to reduce tax distinctions based on matters of form (U.S. vs. foreign corpo
rations) rather than on substance.
Allocation of Interest Expense. The proposal would require allocation of
interest deductions between U.S. and foreign source income on the basis of
consolidated group income from U.S. and foreign sources, rather than on a
separate company basis as at present. It would no longer be possible to
avoid allocating interest expense to foreign source income by separating
interest from group members with foreign source income.
This proposal deals with a larger problem concerning the logic and fair
ness of the rules for apportioning interest expense generally. One of the
major difficulties with existing regulations is the assumption that interest is
fungible except in certain narrow situations. This is contrary to the facts in
many cases. Enactment of this provision should be delayed pending a study
to formulate legislative or regulatory proposals that would deal with the
tracing vs. fungibility issues on a more equitable basis than the present
regulations.
Depreciation of Foreign Assets

This provision would require use of the more conservative RCRS rules of
the Treasury tax reform plan in depreciating assets of foreign branches and
subsidiaries.
This follows the existing practice of allowing less liberal depreciation
benefits for assets used abroad, and can result in additional complexity
beyond domestic book/tax differences because foreign tax authorities may
require depreciation based on a third set of rules. It is frequently difficult to
ensure that foreign accounting personnel can account for depreciation on a
U.S. tax basis.
In the absence of a clear purpose to discourage investment abroad in
depreciable assets, foreign assets should be depreciable on a book basis. If
this is deemed to be too liberal a rule, then the assets should be depreciated
on whatever basis is permissible for domestic assets.
15.04—Revise Taxation of Foreign Exchange Gains and
Losses
The proposals would resolve many unclear issues and codify certain rules
developed through case law and IRS rulings, based on a 1980 Treasury
study, which generally conforms with the foreign exchange rules of FASB
Statement No. 52. We support the approach of the proposal, with the fol
lowing comments:
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Foreign Branches. Foreign currency books of foreign branches will be
translated only under the profit and loss method. This generally follows
FASB Statement No. 52, except that FASB takes account of unrealized
exchange gains and losses for inflationary currencies. Taxpayers should be
allowed to take account of unrealized exchange gains and losses where this
is required by FASB Statement No. 52.
Foreign Currency Denominated Items Where U.S. Dollars Are Functional
Currency. The proposal would reconcile the differences between dollar and
foreign currency interest rates by requiring amortization of the differential
on certain financial assets and liabilities such as trade receivables and paya
bles, debt instruments, and preferred stock. We recognize the theoretical
equity of this approach. However, to avoid unnecessary complexity where
the actual differentials are small, we recommend that the amortization
rules should apply only where the transaction exceeds a minimum dollar
amount.
Foreign Currency Forward Contracts. Gain or loss on forward contracts
hedging the principal amount of business-related foreign currency assets
and liabilities would be treated as adjustments to interest income or ex
pense on an accrual or mark-to-market basis. We support this approach
and recommend that it be extended to forward contracts that hedge the net
asset or net liability position of foreign subsidiaries, to be consistent with
the rules for hedging net asset positions of foreign branches whose books
are maintained in foreign currency.
Foreign Tax Credit

Regular Dividends From Foreign Subsidiaries. There should be consistent
application of the rules for translating foreign currency in calculating the
amount of a distribution treated as a dividend, and all terms in the deemed
paid foreign tax credit formula:
Deemed Paid Foreign Tax = Foreign Tax x Dividend
Accumulated
Earnings and
Profits
Since dividends from foreign subsidiaries frequently represent accumu
lated earnings and profits for several years, we endorse the proposed reten
tion of the Bon Am i approach, under which the deemed-paid tax formula is
translated at the date of the dividend. This rule should also apply in com
puting the amount of a distribution treated as a dividend. It is even more
appropriate than a year-by-year translation given the new pooling approach
for aggregating all earnings in calculating the deemed-paid credit.
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Subpart F Income (Including Investment in U.S. Property). We support
using the average rate of exchange for the year in translating foreign taxes
in the subpart F deemed-paid credit calculation. This is consistent with the
new rules for eliminating unrealized exchange gains and losses in calculat
ing subpart F income and, unlike conventional dividends from foreign non
subpart F subsidiaries, is based on a concept of current distribution of
earnings.
Section 1248. Under current law, the amount of gain treated as a dividend
on the sale or liquidation of a foreign subsidiary takes unrealized gains and
losses into account under subpart F principles. The numerator and de
nominator of the deemed-paid credit calculation are translated on the same
basis; however, translation of foreign taxes is unclear. Since previously
taxed subpart F income is excluded from treatment as a dividend under
section 1248, the remaining earnings should be treated as a conventional
dividend if actually distributed before the sale or liquidation which triggers
section 1248. Consistent with the principles applicable to translating reg
ular dividends and related deemed-paid foreign taxes, we recommend that
earnings and foreign taxes should be translated at the date of a transaction
that triggers application of section 1248.
15.05—Reform the Mirror System of Taxation for the
U.S. Possessions
The proposal would repeal the present 100 percent credit and dividend
received deduction for qualified business and investment income from
Puerto Rico and other U.S. possessions (the comparable benefit for corpo
rations engaged in business in the Virgin Islands would also be eliminated).
The proposals would replace the income based credit with a new wage
based credit that will increase the U.S. tax on possessions operations in
most instances and eliminate any benefits for possessions source invest
ment income. A grandfather clause would preserve the present income
based credit for existing products for five years if the wage credit is not
elected.
The proposal overemphasizes the absolute dollar value of the tax benefit
accruing to certain large companies and does not adequately take into ac
count the interests and concerns of the broader section 936 community.
Puerto Rico has made significant gains in terms of economic growth and
the development of its infrastructure. This was accomplished only through
the maintenance of a strong tax incentive program. It is premature to con
sider any further cutback in the section 936 incentive program.
We are concerned that any significant tampering with section 936 will
have serious adverse consequences for the Puerto Rican economy and its
people. The proposal does not address the issue of the increased transfer
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payments to Puerto Rico that would become necessary in light of a signifi
cant increase in unemployment.
Much of the impetus for repeal of the possessions credit has resulted
from Treasury Department studies that indicate that tax savings per worker
have been far in excess of wage costs per worker. To some extent there may
be questions concerning the methodology of these studies. The studies ap
pear to include foreign taxes on actual investment in determining the tax
savings per worker and do not take into account indirect benefits to the
Puerto Rican economy resulting from employment in businesses which re
ceive the direct benefits of the credit. Further, the proposal does not quan
tify possible loss of tax revenue which is bound to occur as mainland com
panies consider other low-tax locations.
Most studies involving section 936 are based on empirical data relating to
years prior to adoption of the section 936(h) provisions, which require al
location of income to manufactured intangibles. Although the proposal in
dicates that, based on preliminary analysis of 1983 returns, there has been
no reduction in tax benefits per worker as compared to prior years, it is
highly unlikely given the short history of section 936(h) that adequate time
has elapsed to accurately support such a conclusion.
Any moves to repeal the possessions credit should be delayed until ade
quate statistics can be developed regarding the impact of the new (postTEFRA) rules for intangible income. In any case, proposals for repeal
should be postponed pending completion of studies that adequately estab
lish the extent to which anticipated increases in tax revenues will be offset
by increased costs of providing economic assistance to Puerto Rico.
The five-year grandfather clause for the existing credit is insufficient.
Investment and business decisions with respect to existing products have
been made on the premise that the credit would be indefinite. Even after
the actual cost of investment has been recovered, there would be additional
costs and burdens associated with relocating existing operations to the ex
tent repeal of the credit would achieve the intended effect of moving Puerto
Rican operations to the U.S. mainland or elsewhere. Therefore, the grand
father clause should be made permanent regarding existing products, with
appropriate limitations to prevent the introduction of new products under
the blanket of existing products.
Rather than have the wage credit be mutually exclusive of the grand
father clause on a per-corporation basis, taxpayers should be allowed to
elect the wage credit for grandfathered products on a product-by-product
basis.
Where the wage credit is elected, there should be a foreign tax credit for
any possessions taxes. The wage credit is an intended benefit, while the
foreign tax credit is a generally available benefit without regard to any
possessions incentives.
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